--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/gitxelectron/v/1.4.1" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/gitxelectron/v/1.4.1.md" package: "gitxelectron" report_status: "published" title: "gitxelectron@1.4.1 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "1.4.1" --- # gitxelectron@1.4.1 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 20 finding(s) warrant review before installing. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Unknown - **Selected version:** 1.4.1 - **Selected version is latest:** Yes - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The CLI silently executes AI-generated shell commands after a user-invoked push fails, which is a dangerous capability warranting a warning. The flagged desktop runtime locations describe repository and file operations, and its AI conflict repair uses an approval handler; the install hooks inspected do not establish a separate attack. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 94.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-14T17:40:42.016Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-14T17:46:23.423Z - **Download time:** 1789 ms - **Static scan time:** 1351 ms - **AI review time:** 338266 ms - **Total time:** 341407 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** After a failed CLI push, the package sends Git status and the error to an AI provider and executes the provider's returned commands. This can run arbitrary commands with the user's privileges. - **Trigger:** The user runs the CLI push command and the Git operation fails. - **Impact:** A provider response can execute commands in the current working directory and affect the user's files or environment. - **Evidence paths:** bin/cli.js, bin/ai-setup.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-14T17:46:23.423Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The CLI asks an AI service for repair commands and passes each returned command to execSync without a confirmation step. - **Rationale:** The CLI silently executes AI-generated shell commands after a user-invoked push fails, which is a dangerous capability warranting a warning. The flagged desktop runtime locations describe repository and file operations, and its AI conflict repair uses an approval handler; the install hooks inspected do not establish a separate attack. - **Network endpoints:** models.inference.ai.azure.com, router.huggingface.co ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** When a user invokes the CLI push command and it fails, the CLI sends the Git error and status to an AI provider, then runs returned commands with execSync without an approval step., The flagged desktop runtime sites are Git, repository, and file operations tied to workspace paths or IPC requests; AI conflict changes go through an explicit approval handler., The inspected lifecycle hooks run app shutdown and Electron native dependency setup; they do not show the reported data-exfiltration or remote-code behavior. - **Evidence against:** The desktop conflict-repair flow proposes changes through an approval event before applying them; the reviewed runtime locations do not establish unrelated automatic account actions. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to gitxelectron@1.4.1. - Review the evidence and your use of gitxelectron@1.4.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js ``` ### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 4. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 5. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** bin/auto-push.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L17: const crypto = require('crypto') L18: const { spawnSync, spawn } = require('child_process') L19: ``` ### 6. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** bin/postinstall.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L46: const { execSync } = require('child_process') L47: execSync(`powershell -NoProfile -Command "${psCommand}"`, { stdio: 'ignore' }) L48: console.log('✅ Desktop shortcut created successfully!') ``` ### 7. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** bin/auto-push.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L14: L15: const fs = require('fs') L16: const path = require('path') ``` ### 8. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 9. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 10. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 11. Critical: Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** out/main/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L6: const crypto = require("crypto"); L7: const child_process = require("child_process"); L8: const generativeAi = require("@google/generative-ai"); ... L38: const decrypted = electron.safeStorage.decryptString(encrypted); L39: accounts = JSON.parse(decrypted); L40: } ... L133: async function startDeviceFlow(_sessionId) { L134: const response = await fetch("https://github.com/login/device/code", { L135: method: "POST", ... L139: }, L140: body: JSON.stringify({ L141: client_id: GITHUB_CLIENT_ID, ``` ### 12. Critical: Download Execute - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** out/main/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L6: const crypto = require("crypto"); L7: const child_process = require("child_process"); L8: const generativeAi = require("@google/generative-ai"); ... L38: const decrypted = electron.safeStorage.decryptString(encrypted); L39: accounts = JSON.parse(decrypted); L40: } ... L133: async function startDeviceFlow(_sessionId) { L134: const response = await fetch("https://github.com/login/device/code", { L135: method: "POST", ... L139: }, L140: body: JSON.stringify({ L141: client_id: GITHUB_CLIENT_ID, ``` ### 13. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** out/main/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L6: const crypto = require("crypto"); L7: const child_process = require("child_process"); L8: const generativeAi = require("@google/generative-ai"); ... L38: const decrypted = electron.safeStorage.decryptString(encrypted); L39: accounts = JSON.parse(decrypted); L40: } ... L133: async function startDeviceFlow(_sessionId) { L134: const response = await fetch("https://github.com/login/device/code", { L135: method: "POST", ... L139: }, L140: body: JSON.stringify({ L141: client_id: GITHUB_CLIENT_ID, ``` ### 14. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** out/main/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> out/main/index.js L6: const crypto = require("crypto"); L7: const child_process = require("child_process"); L8: const generativeAi = require("@google/generative-ai"); ... L38: const decrypted = electron.safeStorage.decryptString(encrypted); L39: accounts = JSON.parse(decrypted); L40: } ... L133: async function startDeviceFlow(_sessionId) { L134: const response = await fetch("https://github.com/login/device/code", { L135: method: "POST", ... L139: }, L140: body: JSON.stringify({ L141: client_id: GITHUB_CLIENT_ID, ``` ### 15. High: Runtime Package Install - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** bin/postinstall.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L13: const { execSync } = require('child_process') L14: execSync('npx electron-builder install-app-deps', { stdio: 'inherit' }) L15: } else { ``` ### 16. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 17. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 18. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 19. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** bin/postinstall.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = gitxelectron@1.2.1 matchedPath = bin/postinstall.js matchedIdentity = npm:Z2l0eGVsZWN0cm9u:1.2.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 20. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** bin/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = gitxelectron@1.3.9 matchedIdentity = npm:Z2l0eGVsZWN0cm9u:1.3.9 similarity = 0.571 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, preinstall, preuninstall - **Dependencies:** 15 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 19 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 15 ### Published dependency entries - @electron-toolkit/preload ^3.0.2 (Dependency) - @electron-toolkit/utils ^4.0.0 (Dependency) - @google/generative-ai ^0.24.1 (Dependency) - @tailwindcss/postcss ^4.3.3 (Dependency) - autoprefixer ^10.5.4 (Dependency) - chokidar ^5.0.0 (Dependency) - commander ^11.0.0 (Dependency) - framer-motion ^13.1.0 (Dependency) - html2canvas ^1.4.1 (Dependency) - openai ^7.5.0 (Dependency) - postcss ^8.5.26 (Dependency) - qrcode.react ^4.2.0 (Dependency) - react-icons ^5.7.0 (Dependency) - simple-git ^3.36.0 (Dependency) - tailwindcss ^4.3.3 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** gitxelectron - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.4.1 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-10-14T17:29:15.150Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-29T19:17:04.097Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-14T17:46:23.423Z - **Known versions:** 21 - **Latest version:** 1.4.1 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** An elegant, completely silent auto-syncing Git client. Works as a desktop app and npm CLI tool. - **Author:** GitElectron - **Maintainers:** dataxdynamo - **Artifact files:** 13 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,913,105 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()