gm-plugkit@2.0.2502
Bootstrap and daemon-spawn tool for gm plugkit binary. Downloads the correct platform wasm, verifies SHA256, and launches agentplug-runner (the native wasm host) as the spool watcher daemon.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is an explicit-user-command agent-control and remote-code bootstrapper, so it warrants a warning. It does not meet the policy threshold for blocking because package.json declares no install lifecycle hook and no concrete exfiltration or unconsented install-time control-surface mutation was found.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
User runs gm-plugkit or calls ensureReady/bootstrap.
Impact
Can alter future agent behavior and execute remotely delivered native/WASM components.
Mechanism
Remote agent-extension provisioning and daemon bootstrap.
AI rationale
This is an explicit-user-command agent-control and remote-code bootstrapper, so it warrants a warning. It does not meet the policy threshold for blocking because package.json declares no install lifecycle hook and no concrete exfiltration or unconsented install-time control-surface mutation was found.
Evidence
package.jsoncli.jsbootstrap.jsbootstrap-shared.jsbootstrap-wasm-core.jsSKILL.mdCLAUDE.mdAGENTS.md.gm/next-step.md.gm/instructions/~/.agents/skills/<skill>/SKILL.md~/.claude/skills/<skill>/SKILL.md~/.gm-tools/agentplug-runner~/.gm-tools/plugkit.wasm
Network endpoints5
api.github.com/repos/AnEntrypoint/plugkit-bin/releases?per_page=50github.com/AnEntrypoint/plugkit-bin/releases/download/v${version}raw.githubusercontent.com/AnEntrypoint/gm/main/skills/${skillName}/SKILL.mdapi.github.com/repos/AnEntrypoint/agentplug-bin/releases/latest
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 94.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- bootstrap.js: ensureReady writes project agent wiring before bootstrap.
- bootstrap-shared.js creates/edits CLAUDE.md and AGENTS.md and adds .gm instructions.
- bootstrap.js fetches remote SKILL.md files and writes ~/.agents/skills and ~/.claude/skills.
- cli.js downloads, installs, and starts a remote native agentplug-runner daemon.
- SKILL.md directs an agent to obey a persistent external spool instruction stream.
Evidence against
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
- All mutations require importing/calling bootstrap or explicitly running the CLI.
- No source evidence of credential harvesting or data exfiltration.
- Downloaded artifacts are SHA-256 checked, though hashes are fetched remotely.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
3 flagged · loading sourcebootstrap-shared.jsView file
5const os = require('os');
L6: const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
L7: const { pidAlive, sha256OfFileSync } = require('./gm-process');
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
bootstrap-shared.jsView on unpkg · L5bootstrap.jsView file
7const crypto = require('crypto');
L8: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require('child_process');
L9: const { sha256OfFile, sha256OfFileSync } = require('./gm-process');
...
L37:
L38: const wrapperDir = __dirname;
L39:
...
L44: try {
L45: const ownPkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, 'package.json'), 'utf-8'));
L46: if (ownPkg && ownPkg.version) {
...
L167: const dir = gmToolsDir();
L168: const names = process.platform === 'win32'
L169: ? ['agentplug-runner.exe']
Critical
Download Execute
Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.
bootstrap.jsView on unpkg · L77Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js -> bootstrap.js
L7: const crypto = require('crypto');
L8: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require('child_process');
L9: const { sha256OfFile, sha256OfFileSync } = require('./gm-process');
...
L37:
L38: const wrapperDir = __dirname;
L39:
...
L44: try {
L45: const ownPkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, 'package.json'), 'utf-8'));
L46: if (ownPkg && ownPkg.version) {
...
L167: const dir = gmToolsDir();
L168: const names = process.platform === 'win32'
L169: ? ['agentplug-runner.exe']
Findings
2 Critical1 High3 Medium3 Low
CriticalDownload Executebootstrap.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitybootstrap.js
HighChild Processbootstrap-shared.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to gm-plugkit@2.0.2502.
See all versions of gm-plugkit for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of gm-plugkit@2.0.2502 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.