--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/haansi/v/0.1.36" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/haansi/v/0.1.36.md" package: "haansi" report_status: "published" title: "haansi@0.1.36 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "0.1.36" --- # haansi@0.1.36 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — Coding prompts, tool outputs, and associated git metadata can be sent to the remote service using the local Haansi token. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Data Exfiltration - **Selected version:** 0.1.36 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The package uploads local Claude Code and Codex session contents to api.haansi.co. An MCP configuration causes collection to begin automatically whenever the configured server starts. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 94.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-12T00:04:18.367Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-12T00:05:34.334Z - **Download time:** 501 ms - **Static scan time:** 8379 ms - **AI review time:** 67086 ms - **Total time:** 75967 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The package uploads local Claude Code and Codex session contents to api.haansi.co. An MCP configuration causes collection to begin automatically whenever the configured server starts. - **Trigger:** Running haansi setup-mcp and then starting Codex or Claude Code; the separate setup-daemon command also persists scheduled collection. - **Impact:** Coding prompts, tool outputs, and associated git metadata can be sent to the remote service using the local Haansi token. - **Evidence paths:** dist/haansi.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-12T00:05:34.334Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Agent-session harvesting, remote upload, MCP startup collection, and optional launchd persistence. - **Attack narrative:** The CLI reads local coding-agent session logs and uploads their contents to the Haansi API. Although installation itself has no lifecycle hook, its MCP setup registers a server in the agent configuration. When that server starts, its warmup routine silently invokes collection in the background, so normal agent startup can trigger session exfiltration without a separate collect command. A separate command can also install a login-start launchd daemon that repeatedly runs collection. - **Rationale:** This is concrete data exfiltration from AI-agent session stores, coupled to automatic MCP-server startup collection and optional persistence. The absence of an install hook reduces installation-time risk but does not remove the runtime exfiltration path. - **Files touched:** $CODEX\_HOME/sessions/\*\*/rollout-\*.jsonl, ~/.claude/projects/\*\*/\*.jsonl, $CODEX\_HOME/config.toml, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/co.haansi.daemon.plist, ~/.haansi/credentials.json - **Network endpoints:** https://api.haansi.co/api/v1/capture/sessions/raw ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for block:** It reads coding-agent session files, compresses their contents, and posts them to the Haansi API., Its MCP server starts background collection automatically after launch., The explicit MCP setup writes a Codex server entry that launches this collector., An explicit daemon setup creates a launchd service that runs the collector at login. - **Evidence against:** The manifest has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook; only prepublishOnly is present., The collection and setup actions are exposed as named CLI commands rather than running on package installation. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to haansi@0.1.36. - Avoid installing haansi@0.1.36. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. - If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 2. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 3. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/haansi.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L70: try { L71: const binPath = (0, import_node_child_process.execSync)("which haansi", { encoding: "utf-8" }).trim(); L72: if (binPath) return binPath; ``` ### 4. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** dist/haansi.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L41: SERVICE_URL_DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({ L42: haansiApiBaseUrl: "https://api.haansi.co", L43: localApiBaseUrl: "http://localhost:3000", ... L55: function apiUrl() { L56: return process.env.HAANSI_API_URL ?? DEFAULT_API_URL; L57: } ... L61: try { L62: const creds = JSON.parse((0, import_node_fs.readFileSync)(CREDENTIALS_FILE, "utf-8")); L63: if (typeof creds.token === "string" && creds.token) return creds.token; ... L70: try { L71: const binPath = (0, import_node_child_process.execSync)("which haansi", { encoding: "utf-8" }).trim(); L72: if (binPath) return binPath; ``` ### 5. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 6. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 7. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/haansi.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L41: SERVICE_URL_DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({ L42: haansiApiBaseUrl: "https://api.haansi.co", L43: localApiBaseUrl: "http://localhost:3000", ... L55: function apiUrl() { L56: return process.env.HAANSI_API_URL ?? DEFAULT_API_URL; L57: } ... L61: try { L62: const creds = JSON.parse((0, import_node_fs.readFileSync)(CREDENTIALS_FILE, "utf-8")); L63: if (typeof creds.token === "string" && creds.token) return creds.token; ... L70: try { L71: const binPath = (0, import_node_child_process.execSync)("which haansi", { encoding: "utf-8" }).trim(); L72: if (binPath) return binPath; ``` ### 8. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 9. Critical: Remote Asset Decode Execute - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/haansi.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source fetches a remote non-code asset, decodes its contents, and dynamically executes the decoded payload. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L41: SERVICE_URL_DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({ L42: haansiApiBaseUrl: "https://api.haansi.co", L43: localApiBaseUrl: "http://localhost:3000", ... L55: function apiUrl() { L56: return process.env.HAANSI_API_URL ?? DEFAULT_API_URL; L57: } ... L61: try { L62: const creds = JSON.parse((0, import_node_fs.readFileSync)(CREDENTIALS_FILE, "utf-8")); L63: if (typeof creds.token === "string" && creds.token) return creds.token; ... L70: try { L71: const binPath = (0, import_node_child_process.execSync)("which haansi", { encoding: "utf-8" }).trim(); L72: if (binPath) return binPath; ``` ### 10. High: Spawned Bundled Service Listener - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 78.0% - **Path:** dist/haansi.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source launches a detached bundled service that exposes a broad-bound HTTP listener. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Detached bundled service listener: dist/haansi.js launches a Node helper and exposes a broad-bound HTTP listener. L41: SERVICE_URL_DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({ L42: haansiApiBaseUrl: "https://api.haansi.co", L43: localApiBaseUrl: "http://localhost:3000", ... L55: function apiUrl() { L56: return process.env.HAANSI_API_URL ?? DEFAULT_API_URL; L57: } ... L61: try { L62: const creds = JSON.parse((0, import_node_fs.readFileSync)(CREDENTIALS_FILE, "utf-8")); L63: if (typeof creds.token === "string" && creds.token) return creds.token; ... L70: try { L71: const binPath = (0, import_node_child_process.execSync)("which haansi", { encoding: "utf-8" }).trim(); L72: if (binPath) return binPath; ``` ### 11. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/haansi.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/haansi.js Reachable file contains a blocking source-risk pattern. ``` ### 12. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/haansi.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/haansi.js L41: SERVICE_URL_DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({ L42: haansiApiBaseUrl: "https://api.haansi.co", L43: localApiBaseUrl: "http://localhost:3000", ... L55: function apiUrl() { L56: return process.env.HAANSI_API_URL ?? DEFAULT_API_URL; L57: } ... L61: try { L62: const creds = JSON.parse((0, import_node_fs.readFileSync)(CREDENTIALS_FILE, "utf-8")); L63: if (typeof creds.token === "string" && creds.token) return creds.token; ... L70: try { L71: const binPath = (0, import_node_child_process.execSync)("which haansi", { encoding: "utf-8" }).trim(); L72: if (binPath) return binPath; ``` ### 13. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 14. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 15. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 16. Medium: Wildcard Dependency - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest contains a wildcard dependency. ### 17. Low: No License - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest does not declare a clear license. ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 1 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 3 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 1 ### Published dependency entries - @company/pii \* (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** haansi - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.1.36 - **Version published:** 2026-09-10T18:11:21.729Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-13T01:57:53.632Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-09-27T21:24:00.412Z - **Known versions:** 10 - **Latest version:** 0.1.45 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Haansi CLI - Session collector and MCP server for Claude Code & OpenAI Codex - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18.0.0 - **Artifact files:** 3 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 3,139,717 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()