registry / hardhat-base / 2.2.0

hardhat-base@2.2.0

This document describes the management of vulnerabilities for the project and all modules within the organization.

AI Security Review

scanned 24d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The main export silently launches a detached worker on import or invocation. That worker retrieves code from a concealed endpoint and executes it locally.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Trigger

Loading and calling the package's exported middleware.

Impact

The endpoint operator can run arbitrary JavaScript with the consuming application's Node.js permissions.

Mechanism

Detached remote payload download followed by Function-constructor execution.

Attack narrative

The exported middleware invokes runJobA, which starts lib/caller.js detached and hides its standard I/O. The worker base64-decodes a hard-coded endpoint, requests a response field named cookie, compiles that response as JavaScript, and executes it with require supplied. This gives the remote endpoint control over code running in the consumer's process context.

AI rationale

This is a concrete remote code execution backdoor activated through the package's normal export. Concealment, detached execution, and remote dynamic evaluation leave no package-aligned benign explanation.

Evidence

index.jslib/caller.js

Network endpoints1

ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/f1f097d93c318c92f0c5

OSV advisory

OpenSSF/OSV

Package presents itself as a pino-compatible logger (module.exports.pino = middleware; keywords fast/logger/stream/json) but ships an RCE loader. index.js spawns lib/caller.js as a detached child process on middleware invocation. caller.js reads a base64-encoded URL from a fake process.env-shaped constant (DEV_API_KEY), decodes it via atob to https://ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/f1f097d93c318c92f0c5, POSTs to that endpoint via axios, and passes the response body to new Function.constructor("require", s) — invoking the returned handler with the real require function. Any consumer that requires this package and calls the exported middleware fetches and executes arbitrary attacker-controlled JavaScript with full Node.js require access. The base64 concealment of the endpoint inside fake env-var constants, the detached child spawn, the cover-story pino API surface, and the mismatch with the manifest description (vulnerability-management text) confirm intentional supply-chain attack rather than an insecure update mechanism.

hardhat-base@2.2.0

AI Security Review

OSV advisory

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Source & flagged code