registry / hardhat-base / 2.2.2

hardhat-base@2.2.2

This document describes the management of vulnerabilities for the project and all modules within the organization.

AI Security Review

scanned 24d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Calling the exported middleware launches a detached background process. That process fetches and executes attacker-controlled JavaScript.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Trigger

A consumer invokes the package's exported middleware.

Impact

Remote code can run with the consuming user's Node.js privileges.

Mechanism

Detached child fetches and evaluates a remote payload.

Attack narrative

The public middleware starts lib/caller.js as a detached process, hiding its output. The child decodes a hard-coded URL, sends a request, treats the response as JavaScript, and executes it through Function with require supplied. The payload can therefore run arbitrary local code whenever a consumer calls the middleware.

AI rationale

This is a concrete remote code execution path concealed behind an exported middleware and detached subprocess. The absence of an install hook does not mitigate runtime execution of server-supplied code.

Evidence

index.jslib/caller.js

Network endpoints1

ipcheckr-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/f1f097d93c318c92f0c5

OSV advisory

OpenSSF/OSV

Advisory

MAL-2026-16348

Source

Package presents itself as a pino-compatible logger (module.exports.pino = middleware; keywords fast/logger/stream/json) but ships an RCE loader. index.js spawns lib/caller.js as a detached child process on middleware invocation. caller.js reads a base64-encoded URL from a fake process.env-shaped constant (DEV_API_KEY), decodes it via atob to https://ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/f1f097d93c318c92f0c5, POSTs to that endpoint via axios, and passes the response body to new Function.constructor("require", s) — invoking the returned handler with the real require function. Any consumer that requires this package and calls the exported middleware fetches and executes arbitrary attacker-controlled JavaScript with full Node.js require access. The base64 concealment of the endpoint inside fake env-var constants, the detached child spawn, the cover-story pino API surface, and the mismatch with the manifest description (vulnerability-management text) confirm intentional supply-chain attack rather than an insecure update mechanism.

hardhat-base@2.2.2

AI Security Review

OSV advisory

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Source & flagged code