registry  /  hehehe  /  2.0.2

hehehe@2.0.2

High-performance DOM utility and diagnostic bridge for modern web applications.

AI Security Review

scanned 3h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Running the CLI starts a detached, self-respawning Electron watchdog disguised as a Windows process. The app covertly captures visible test content, sends it to AI services, and presents or types answers while evading proctoring and capture controls.

Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Explicit execution of the `hehehe` CLI or `node bin/kalamasha-tool.js`
Impact
Enables concealed examination cheating, resists termination, and includes an inert credential-harvesting helper.
Mechanism
Stealth proctor-evasion watchdog with screen/UI capture and AI-assisted answer injection
Attack narrative
The explicit CLI launcher detaches into a watchdog, disguises Electron as `SearchFilterHost.exe`, and repeatedly respawns it after termination. The Electron payload uses global hooks, hidden/capture-excluded windows, UI automation, and screenshot capture to collect test content. It sends prompts to Gemini or an operator-configured GAS endpoint, polls/injects answers, and supports synthetic typing. The source repeatedly identifies TestPad/proctor avoidance as its objective. A separate packaged PowerShell helper can decrypt ChatGPT/OpenAI browser cookies, but was not found on the runtime call path.
Rationale
Source inspection confirms a concrete stealth-and-persistence workflow designed to bypass proctoring and automate AI-assisted answers. The harmless postinstall hook does not mitigate the malicious runtime behavior exposed through the package CLI.
Evidence
package.jsonmain.jsbin/kalamasha-tool.jsbin/stealth_capture.ps1bin/uia_extract.pybin/chrome_cookies.ps1config.jsonbin/uia_extract.exe
Network endpoints5
gemini.google.com/app*://*.openai.com/**://*.chatgpt.com/**://*.google.com/**://*.deepseek.com/*

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Malicious at 98.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • `bin/kalamasha-tool.js` detaches a watchdog and respawns its child after termination.
  • `bin/kalamasha-tool.js` copies Electron as `SearchFilterHost.exe` to evade Electron-targeted killing.
  • `main.js` hides an always-on-top capture-excluded overlay and explicitly targets proctor evasion.
  • `main.js` captures screen/UI text, submits prompts to Gemini or configured GAS, and injects returned answers.
  • `main.js` spoofs browser identity and disables common automation/visibility signals.
  • `bin/chrome_cookies.ps1` decrypts OpenAI/ChatGPT browser cookies, though no source reference invokes it.
Evidence against
  • `package.json` postinstall only attempts to require Electron and does not invoke the launcher.
  • No hard-coded third-party exfiltration URL was found; GAS routing requires user-supplied `gasUrl`.
  • `bin/chrome_cookies.ps1` is not referenced by the inspected JavaScript source.
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNativeBindingsNetworkShell
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.
scanned 3 file(s), 91.5 KB of source, external domains: chat.openai.com, chatgpt.com, gemini.google.com

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source
package.jsonView file
scripts.postinstall = node -e "try{require('electron')}catch(e){console.log('Electron will download on first run.')}"
Critical
Red Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script matches a deterministic static-gate block pattern.

package.jsonView on unpkg
scripts.postinstall = node -e "try{require('electron')}catch(e){console.log('Electron will download on first run.')}"
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg
bin/kalamasha-tool.jsView file
2L3: const { spawn, execSync } = require('child_process'); L4: const path = require('path');
High
Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/kalamasha-tool.jsView on unpkg · L2
2Cross-file remote execution chain: bin/kalamasha-tool.js spawns main.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L2: L3: const { spawn, execSync } = require('child_process'); L4: const path = require('path'); ... L10: L11: const rootDir = path.resolve(__dirname, '..'); L12: const mainPath = path.resolve(rootDir, 'main.js'); L13: const appDataDir = path.join(process.env.LOCALAPPDATA, 'Microsoft', 'Windows', 'Diagnostics'); L14: const bootLog = path.join(appDataDir, 'boot.log');
High
Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

bin/kalamasha-tool.jsView on unpkg · L2
67try { L68: execSync('npm install ' + missing.join(' ') + ' --no-save', { L69: cwd: rootDir,
High
Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

bin/kalamasha-tool.jsView on unpkg · L67
main.jsView file
617// STRATEGY: Spawn a NEW electron process on the target desktop L618: // via CreateProcessW (PowerShell helper). Parent stays alive and goes dormant. L619:
High
Shell

Package source references shell execution.

main.jsView on unpkg · L617
bin/uia_extract.exeView file
path = bin/uia_extract.exe kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 27459953 magicHex = [redacted]
Medium
Ships Native Binary

Package ships native binary artifacts.

bin/uia_extract.exeView on unpkg
bin/chrome_cookies.ps1View file
path = bin/chrome_cookies.ps1 kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 11973 magicHex = [redacted]
Medium
Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

bin/chrome_cookies.ps1View on unpkg

Findings

1 Critical5 High5 Medium4 Low
CriticalRed Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighChild Processbin/kalamasha-tool.js
HighShellmain.js
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextbin/kalamasha-tool.js
HighRuntime Package Installbin/kalamasha-tool.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Native Binarybin/uia_extract.exe
MediumShips Build Helperbin/chrome_cookies.ps1
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings