hehehee@2.0.19

Package metadata and README advertise a 'Windows diagnostic utility' / 'high-performance DOM utility', but the actual code (main.js) is a stealth Electron overlay designed to defeat Safe Exam Browser and similar proctoring tools. config.json ships a real-looking `__Secure-next-auth.session-token` JWE for chatgpt.com; main.js loads it at startup and injects it into a `persist:chatgpt` Electron session before navigating to chatgpt.com, so every screenshot/UIA-extracted text the tool sends through ChatGPT goes through a hardcoded account that the package author (or whoever harvested the cookie) controls and can read in conversation history. The bin (bin/kalamasha-tool.js) copies the bundled electron.exe to a sibling named `SearchFilterHost.exe` (the real Windows Search Filter Host system binary) inside node_modules/electron/dist and spawns it as a detached watchdog with randomised 1–25s respawn jitter, persisting under `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Diagnostics` (a path mimicking a Microsoft-owned directory) and only stopping when a `.kill_watchdog` file appears. The CLI also auto-runs `npm install <missing> --no-save` at runtime for missing native modules without user consent. The combination of fraudulent package description, process-name masquerade as a Windows system binary, persistence with anti-kill respawn, anti-proctor stealth (WDA_EXCLUDEFROMCAPTURE, anti-Alt-Tab styling, cross-desktop migration), and a hardcoded ChatGPT session that silently relays user screen content to a third-party account constitutes a clear supply-chain harm to anyone following the README's quick-start instructions.