hostinger-api-mcp@2.11.0
MCP server for Hostinger API
AI Security Review
scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe runtime permits an unrestricted API destination override while forwarding Hostinger bearer tokens, so credential exposure is a real conditional risk. The default destination is Hostinger, and the install and build signals do not establish malicious behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The runtime accepts API_BASE_URL without destination validation; otherwise it uses the Hostinger developer API.
- A user tool execution can obtain an access token and attach it as a bearer token to a request built from that base URL.
- Tokens can come from saved OAuth credentials or a refresh flow.
- The OAuth issuer defaults to Hostinger, while also allowing an environment override.
- The manifest defines start, build, and start:ts scripts but no install lifecycle hook.
- The build script invokes the TypeScript compiler as part of an explicit build command.
- The default API and OAuth destinations are Hostinger services.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.
build.jsView on unpkg · L18This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
src/core/oauth.jsFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to hostinger-api-mcp@2.11.0.
See all versions of hostinger-api-mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of hostinger-api-mcp@2.11.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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