hubert-application-get-document-preview-am@20.4.6

On require() of the package, index.js loads setup.js which selects a platform key, downloads a native binary from one of four hardcoded workers.dev endpoints (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT fallback channel over *.well1.site (tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, win.dl.well1.site), writes the payload to /tmp or %TEMP% under deceptive names such as dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe and.cache_<rand>, chmods it 755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. The hostnames are reconstructed at runtime by array.join('') to evade static analysis; the DNS-TXT channel reassembles base64 chunks from N.<domain> TXT records as a covert transport when HTTPS is blocked. No hash or signature verification is performed, and the destinations are unrelated to any legitimate package publisher. A second self-contained dropper bundled in lib/telemetry.js (framed as an 'Analytics SDK') contains duplicate machinery — require("child_"+"process"), base64 chunk decoding, fs['chmod'+'Sync'] to 0755, and cp.spawn('/bin/sh',['-c', filePath+' &']) — providing an alternate execution path. ## Source: ghsa-malware (9fb6aabe64feb9fbd337743b271809defa5a4e781526ee80c08aa6e01fb09bdf) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.