registry  /  hyper-animator  /  2.15.0

hyper-animator@2.15.0

Claude Code skill for HyperFrames animation pipeline — natural language to rendered video

AI Security Review

scanned 2h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM blocks this version under the AI-agent control-surface policy. npm postinstall installs a package-supplied Claude Code skill into the user's home directory and alters its configuration. It then executes a helper that downloads catalog content into that agent-controlled skill tree.

Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
npm install of hyper-animator@2.15.0
Impact
Persists package instructions and remotely obtained HTML in a broadly used AI-agent skill location without an explicit user setup command.
Mechanism
Unconsented postinstall mutation of ~/.claude/skills plus remote catalog synchronization
Policy narrative
On npm install, the postinstall script copies the supplied skill into ~/.claude/skills/hyper-animator, creates an agent-skill .env file, and runs sync-catalog.py. That helper invokes the external hyperframes CLI to fetch HTML and writes it beneath the installed Claude skill directory. This is an unconsented lifecycle-time mutation of a foreign, broad AI-agent control surface.
Rationale
Source inspection confirms a concrete postinstall chain that writes package and remotely fetched content into ~/.claude/skills. Under the firewall policy, this warrants blocking regardless of the package-branded destination.
Evidence
package.jsoninstall.jsskills/hyper-animator/scripts/sync-catalog.pyskills/hyper-animator/scripts/minimax-gen.pyskills/hyper-animator/SKILL.md~/.claude/skills/hyper-animator~/.claude/skills/hyper-animator/.env~/.claude/skills/hyper-animator/references/source-cache
Network endpoints1
api.minimaxi.com/v1/music_generation

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Malicious at 97.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for policy block
  • package.json defines postinstall: node install.js.
  • install.js runs automatically without a setup argument.
  • install.js copies package files into ~/.claude/skills/hyper-animator.
  • install.js creates ~/.claude/skills/hyper-animator/.env.
  • postinstall executes sync-catalog.py through child_process.execSync.
  • sync-catalog.py invokes hyperframes add and stores fetched HTML in the Claude skill tree.
Evidence against
  • No credential value is read or exfiltrated by install.js.
  • MiniMax API requests are in an explicit generation helper, not install.js.
  • No eval, VM loading, or shell interpolation beyond the fixed Python command was found.
  • The copied content is package-branded, but it still mutates a foreign Claude control surface automatically.
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessFilesystemShell
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.
scanned 2 file(s), 12.3 KB of source, external domains: platform.minimaxi.com

Source & flagged code

4 flagged · loading source
package.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node install.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg
•scripts.postinstall = node install.js
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg
install.jsView file
12Install-time AI-agent control hijack evidence: L12: const home = os.homedir(); L13: const destDir = path.join(home, '.claude', 'skills', 'hyper-animator'); L14: const srcDir = path.join(__dirname, 'skills', 'hyper-animator'); ... L38: function copyDir(src, dest) { L39: if (!fs.existsSync(dest)) fs.mkdirSync(dest, { recursive: true }); L40: for (const entry of fs.readdirSync(src, { withFileTypes: true })) { ... L43: if (entry.isDirectory()) { copyDir(s, d); } L44: else { fs.copyFileSync(s, d); if (entry.name.endsWith('.sh')) fs.chmodSync(d, 0o755); } L45: } ... L57: } L58: if (added > 0) fs.writeFileSync(envPath, content); L59: return { envPath, added }; Payload evidence from skills/hyper-animator/SKILL.md: L26: L27: Display as: `hyper-animator v<version> (commit <commit>)` in the first message to the user. Example: `hyper-animator v1.10.1 (f6b3697)`. This helps with debugging — knowing exactly... L28: ... L149: |---------|---------------| L150: | Beat JSON generated | `data: beat detection — <composition-name>` | L151: | BGM/SFX files generated | `asset: audio generated via <source>` | ... L992: - WAV format, 32kHz mono, compatible with HyperFrames `<audio>` element L993: - Exit…
Critical
Ai Agent Control Hijack

Install-time source drops package-supplied AI-agent/MCP control files or instructions.

install.jsView on unpkg · L12
skills/hyper-animator/scripts/lint-html.pyView file
•path = skills/hyper-animator/scripts/lint-html.py kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 16134 magicHex = [redacted]
Medium
Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

skills/hyper-animator/scripts/lint-html.pyView on unpkg

Findings

1 Critical1 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackinstall.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumShips Build Helperskills/hyper-animator/scripts/lint-html.py
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings