registry  /  hyper-animator  /  2.2.0

hyper-animator@2.2.0

Claude Code skill for HyperFrames animation pipeline — natural language to rendered video

AI Security Review

scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM blocks this version under the AI-agent control-surface policy. The package mutates Claude Code's AI-agent skill directory automatically during npm postinstall. It installs package-supplied agent instructions and then executes a bundled Python sync script, creating an unconsented agent control-surface change at install time.

Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
npm install or package postinstall lifecycle
Impact
Unconsented modification of ~/.claude/skills can affect future AI-agent behavior and run package-defined workflows outside the npm project boundary.
Mechanism
postinstall AI-agent skill installation plus install-time child_process execution
Policy narrative
On npm install, package.json runs install.js. That script copies the bundled Claude skill into ~/.claude/skills/hyper-animator, writes a .env template for API credentials, and executes sync-catalog.py. The installed SKILL.md becomes future AI-agent control-plane content, so the package changes agent behavior outside the installing project without an explicit user setup command.
Rationale
Although the helper scripts mostly match the advertised animation/audio package, automatic postinstall writes to ~/.claude/skills are an unconsented AI-agent control-surface mutation. That concrete install-time behavior warrants blocking even without credential exfiltration. Product guard normalized a non-low false-positive publish_block request to warn-only suspicious.
Evidence
package.jsoninstall.jsskills/hyper-animator/SKILL.mdskills/hyper-animator/scripts/sync-catalog.pyskills/hyper-animator/scripts/minimax-gen.pyskills/hyper-animator/scripts/tts-gen.py~/.claude/skills/hyper-animator~/.claude/skills/hyper-animator/.env~/.claude/skills/hyper-animator/references/source-cache
Network endpoints3
platform.minimaxi.comapi.minimaxi.comapi.minimax.io

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Suspicious at 93.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for policy block
  • package.json defines postinstall: node install.js and bin points to install.js
  • install.js postinstall copies package files into ~/.claude/skills/hyper-animator
  • install.js creates/updates ~/.claude/skills/hyper-animator/.env with MiniMax key fields
  • install.js runs child_process execSync: python3 .../scripts/sync-catalog.py --workers 4 during install
  • sync-catalog.py invokes hyperframes add and writes cached HTML under ~/.claude/skills/hyper-animator/references/source-cache
  • SKILL.md is an AI-agent skill instruction file with command-running workflow guidance
Evidence against
  • No credential harvesting or exfiltration code found in install.js
  • MiniMax API use in minimax-gen.py and tts-gen.py appears user-invoked for audio generation
  • No obfuscation, native binary loading, persistence daemon, or destructive install-time deletion found
  • Network/API hosts are aligned with advertised animation/audio functionality
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessFilesystemShell
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.
scanned 1 file(s), 5.46 KB of source, external domains: platform.minimaxi.com

Source & flagged code

4 flagged · loading source
package.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node install.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg
•scripts.postinstall = node install.js
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg
install.jsView file
12Install-time AI-agent control hijack evidence: L12: const home = os.homedir(); L13: const destDir = path.join(home, '.claude', 'skills', 'hyper-animator'); L14: const srcDir = path.join(__dirname, 'skills', 'hyper-animator'); ... L38: function copyDir(src, dest) { L39: if (!fs.existsSync(dest)) fs.mkdirSync(dest, { recursive: true }); L40: for (const entry of fs.readdirSync(src, { withFileTypes: true })) { ... L43: if (entry.isDirectory()) { copyDir(s, d); } L44: else { fs.copyFileSync(s, d); if (entry.name.endsWith('.sh')) fs.chmodSync(d, 0o755); } L45: } ... L57: } L58: if (added > 0) fs.writeFileSync(envPath, content); L59: return { envPath, added }; Payload evidence from skills/hyper-animator/SKILL.md: L26: L27: Display as: `hyper-animator v<version> (commit <commit>)` in the first message to the user. Example: `hyper-animator v1.10.1 (f6b3697)`. This helps with debugging — knowing exactly... L28: ... L149: |---------|---------------| L150: | Beat JSON generated | `data: beat detection — <composition-name>` | L151: | BGM/SFX files generated | `asset: audio generated via <source>` | ... L912: - WAV format, 32kHz mono, compatible with HyperFrames `<audio>` element L913: - Exit…
Critical
Ai Agent Control Hijack

Install-time source drops package-supplied AI-agent/MCP control files or instructions.

install.jsView on unpkg · L12
skills/hyper-animator/scripts/preview-gen.pyView file
•path = skills/hyper-animator/scripts/preview-gen.py kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 11136 magicHex = [redacted]
Medium
Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

skills/hyper-animator/scripts/preview-gen.pyView on unpkg

Findings

1 Critical1 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackinstall.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumShips Build Helperskills/hyper-animator/scripts/preview-gen.py
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings