registry  /  hyper-animator  /  2.3.0

hyper-animator@2.3.0

Claude Code skill for HyperFrames animation pipeline — natural language to rendered video

AI Security Review

scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM blocks this version under the AI-agent control-surface policy. The package mutates Claude Code's skill/control surface automatically at npm install time. It installs package-supplied agent instructions and scripts into ~/.claude/skills and attempts to execute a copied Python helper during postinstall.

Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
npm install or any install path that runs package postinstall
Impact
A dependency install can add or replace local AI-agent instructions and executable helper scripts that later steer the user's agent behavior.
Mechanism
unconsented lifecycle AI-agent control-surface mutation plus install-time helper execution
Policy narrative
On installation, npm runs install.js, which recursively copies the package's hyper-animator skill into ~/.claude/skills/hyper-animator, writes a .env scaffold, chmods shell helpers, and attempts to execute the copied sync-catalog.py. The installed SKILL.md becomes local AI-agent instruction material that can later direct git operations, file generation, tool execution, and rendering workflows without a separate user approval at install time.
Rationale
Static inspection confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of a Claude Code skill directory, which is an AI-agent control-surface write activated by package installation. Even though the visible content is mostly package-aligned, lifecycle installation of agent instructions and executable helpers is concrete attack behavior under the firewall policy. Product guard normalized a non-low false-positive publish_block request to warn-only suspicious.
Evidence
package.jsoninstall.jsskills/hyper-animator/SKILL.mdskills/hyper-animator/scripts/sync-catalog.pyskills/hyper-animator/scripts/minimax-gen.pyskills/hyper-animator/scripts/tts-gen.py~/.claude/skills/hyper-animator~/.claude/skills/hyper-animator/.env~/.claude/skills/hyper-animator/references/source-cache
Network endpoints5
platform.minimaxi.comapi.minimaxi.comapi.minimax.iogithub.com/realpkuasule/hyper-animator-2cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/gsap@3.14.2/dist/gsap.min.js

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Suspicious at 93.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for policy block
  • package.json runs postinstall: node install.js and maps bin to install.js.
  • install.js postinstall copies package-controlled skills/hyper-animator into ~/.claude/skills/hyper-animator.
  • install.js creates/updates ~/.claude/skills/hyper-animator/.env and chmods copied .sh files.
  • install.js invokes child_process execSync to run copied scripts/sync-catalog.py during install.
  • SKILL.md is AI-agent control content with operational instructions, git commands, file writes, rendering workflow, and external tool use.
  • sync-catalog.py writes cache files under ~/.claude/skills/hyper-animator/references/source-cache and shells out to hyperframes.
Evidence against
  • No obfuscated payloads or credential harvesting found in inspected files.
  • MiniMax API calls in minimax-gen.py and tts-gen.py are user-invoked helper functions for advertised audio/video generation.
  • Network endpoints mostly align with the package's animation/audio-generation purpose.
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessFilesystemShell
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.
scanned 1 file(s), 5.78 KB of source, external domains: platform.minimaxi.com

Source & flagged code

4 flagged · loading source
package.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node install.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg
•scripts.postinstall = node install.js
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg
install.jsView file
12Install-time AI-agent control hijack evidence: L12: const home = os.homedir(); L13: const destDir = path.join(home, '.claude', 'skills', 'hyper-animator'); L14: const srcDir = path.join(__dirname, 'skills', 'hyper-animator'); ... L38: function copyDir(src, dest) { L39: if (!fs.existsSync(dest)) fs.mkdirSync(dest, { recursive: true }); L40: for (const entry of fs.readdirSync(src, { withFileTypes: true })) { ... L43: if (entry.isDirectory()) { copyDir(s, d); } L44: else { fs.copyFileSync(s, d); if (entry.name.endsWith('.sh')) fs.chmodSync(d, 0o755); } L45: } ... L57: } L58: if (added > 0) fs.writeFileSync(envPath, content); L59: return { envPath, added }; Payload evidence from skills/hyper-animator/SKILL.md: L26: L27: Display as: `hyper-animator v<version> (commit <commit>)` in the first message to the user. Example: `hyper-animator v1.10.1 (f6b3697)`. This helps with debugging — knowing exactly... L28: ... L149: |---------|---------------| L150: | Beat JSON generated | `data: beat detection — <composition-name>` | L151: | BGM/SFX files generated | `asset: audio generated via <source>` | ... L912: - WAV format, 32kHz mono, compatible with HyperFrames `<audio>` element L913: - Exit…
Critical
Ai Agent Control Hijack

Install-time source drops package-supplied AI-agent/MCP control files or instructions.

install.jsView on unpkg · L12
skills/hyper-animator/scripts/preview-gen.pyView file
•path = skills/hyper-animator/scripts/preview-gen.py kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 11136 magicHex = [redacted]
Medium
Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

skills/hyper-animator/scripts/preview-gen.pyView on unpkg

Findings

1 Critical1 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackinstall.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumShips Build Helperskills/hyper-animator/scripts/preview-gen.py
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings