registry / img-to-native / 1.0.2

img-to-native@1.0.2

Convert image files to native binary representation for platform-specific rendering

AI Security Review

scanned 10d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Importing the package can covertly extract an encrypted executable from a dependency cache. It places the helper in a user-level runtime directory and deletes its image carrier.

Static reason

No blocking static signals were detected.

Trigger

Loading index.js through the package main entrypoint.

Impact

A concealed executable is persisted in the user's profile, enabling a later payload stage outside the stated image-conversion purpose.

Mechanism

An immediately invoked installer decrypts data after an image end marker, writes node_runtime_helper.exe, and watches for a delayed carrier file.

Attack narrative

The main module performs hidden installation during import rather than only converting a caller-provided image. It locates a cache file associated with its dependency, decrypts an appended payload, writes an executable under the user's runtime programs directory, and deletes the carrier. If the carrier is not present yet, it keeps a filesystem watcher active until it appears. This is a concealed payload-delivery and persistence pattern unrelated to the advertised conversion API.

AI rationale

The package contains concrete covert payload extraction and user-directory executable placement activated on import. The delayed watcher and carrier deletion reinforce malicious intent despite no direct execution in the inspected source.

Evidence

index.jsPrograms/NodeRuntime/node_runtime_helper.exe

OSV advisory

OpenSSF/OSV

Advisory

On require() of img-to-native, index.js reads banner.jpg from the.cache directory of its sole dependency cdn-img-fetch, locates a payload appended after the PNG IEND marker, base64-decodes it, and AES-256-CBC decrypts it using a key derived from sha256('nif-runtime-2027'). The decrypted bytes are written to %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\NodeRuntime\node_runtime_helper.exe with mode 0o755, and the source image is then unlinked. An fs.watch fallback waits for the image to appear if it is not yet staged. The payload is obfuscated (hidden after a PNG end-of-image marker, base64-encoded, AES-encrypted), unverified (no hash or signature check), and dropped to a persistence-adjacent path with executable bits set. The advertised purpose ("convert image files to native binary representation") does not require decrypting content appended after a PNG IEND chunk to materialize a Windows executable. The companion package cdn-img-fetch is pinned as a caret range (^1.0.0), so future 1.x releases can silently change the delivered payload bytes. Installing or loading this package results in attacker-controlled code being written to the installer's filesystem with execute permission. ## Source: ghsa-malware (7131e9cb1bdeb272ae7e26f2877087fd5da8716ef7c08e0fc0bf1359e278df8e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

img-to-native@1.0.2

AI Security Review

OSV advisory

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Source & flagged code