registry / AI-agent capability abuse / instar / 1.3.1348

instar@1.3.1348

Coherence infrastructure for self-evolving AI agents — on the Claude Code or Codex subscription you already have.

AI Security Review

scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The automatic migration installs a permission bypass for the project’s Claude agent without a per-action consent gate. This warrants a warning for agent capability abuse; the source does not show that an npm lifecycle hook performs this mutation.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

Server startup detects that the installed version differs from the last migrated version.

Impact

Claude Code subagent tool requests can proceed without individual permission approval, expanding the agent’s authority.

Mechanism

The migrator registers a project hook that runs the generated auto-approval script, which returns an allow decision for permission requests.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/commands/server.jsdist/core/PostUpdateMigrator.js.claude/settings.json.instar/hooks/instar/auto-approve-permissions.js

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 96.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

On server startup, a version mismatch triggers the migrator automatically.
The migrator registers a catch-all PermissionRequest hook and writes the updated settings to the project’s .claude/settings.json file.
The generated hook returns an allow decision for PermissionRequest events, bypassing individual permission prompts.
The npm postinstall script runs a SQLite native-module repair; it does not invoke this agent configuration change.

Evidence against

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 2,069 file(s), 30.3 MB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, abc123.trycloudflare.com, accounts.google.com, ai.google.dev, api.anthropic.com, api.cloudflare.com, api.github.com, api.groq.com, api.mail.tm, api.openai.com, api.slack.com, api.telegra.ph, api.telegram.org, api.typesafe.ai, auth.anthropic.com, auth.openai.com, blob.vercel-storage.com, bot-me.ai, brew.sh, chatgpt.com, claude.ai, claude.com, cli.github.com, console.anthropic.com, console.cloud.google.com, dawn.bot-me.ai, docs.anthropic.com, example.invalid, feedback.dawn-tunnel.dev, files.slack.com, git-scm.com, github.com, graph.facebook.com, groq.com, instar-telemetry.sagemind-ai.workers.dev, instar.sh, myaccount.google.com, myapp.vercel.app, nodejs.org, openrouter.ai, platform.claude.com, platform.openai.com, raw.githubusercontent.com, sagemindai.io, sentry.io, slack.com, staging.myapp.com, support.google.com, telegra.ph, threadline-relay.fly.dev

Source & flagged code

18 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 44-84json

44 "lint:undefined-erasing-default-merge": "node scripts/lint-no-undefined-erasing-default-merge.js",

45 "lint:destructive": "node scripts/lint-no-direct-destructive.js",

46 "lint:dev-agent-dark-gate": "node scripts/lint-dev-agent-dark-gate.js",

47 "lint:guard-manifest": "node scripts/lint-guard-manifest.js",

48 "lint:dev-agent-dark-gate:staged": "node scripts/lint-dev-agent-dark-gate.js --staged",

49 "lint:destructive:staged": "node scripts/lint-no-direct-destructive.js --staged",

50 "lint:llm-http": "node scripts/lint-no-direct-llm-http.js",

51 "lint:scrape-realness": "node scripts/lint-scrape-fixture-realness.js",

52 "lint:scrape-realness:staged": "node scripts/lint-scrape-fixture-realness.js --staged",

53 "lint:llm-attribution": "node scripts/lint-llm-attribution.js",

54 "lint:llm-attribution:staged": "node scripts/lint-llm-attribution.js --staged",

55 "lint:llm-http:staged": "node scripts/lint-no-direct-llm-http.js --staged",

56 "lint:credential-write": "node scripts/lint-no-unfunneled-credential-write.js",

57 "lint:credential-write:staged": "node scripts/lint-no-unfunneled-credential-write.js --staged",

58 "clean": "rm -rf dist",

59 "check:upgrade-guide": "node scripts/check-upgrade-guide.js",

60 "check:pre-push-gate": "node scripts/pre-push-gate.js",

61 "check:release": "node scripts/analyze-release.js",

62 "check:contract-evidence": "node scripts/check-contract-evidence.js",

63 "prepublishOnly": "npm run build && node scripts/verify-codex-stage-b-release-evidence.mjs && npm run check:upgrade-guide && npm run check:contract-evidence",

64 "postinstall": "node scripts/fix-better-sqlite3.cjs",

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L64

65 "prepare": "husky",

66 "lint:standards-registry-path": "node scripts/lint-no-direct-standards-registry-path.mjs",

67 "lint:framework-list": "node scripts/lint-framework-list-completeness.mjs"

68 },

69 "keywords": [

70 "instar",

71 "ai-agent",

72 "autonomous-agent",

73 "claude",

74 "claude-code",

75 "agent-framework",

76 "telegram-bot",

77 "job-scheduler",

78 "agent-memory",

79 "agent-identity",

80 "llm",

81 "mcp",

82 "cli",

83 "molt",

84 "lobster"

dist/threadline/PipeSessionSpawner.jsView file

Lines 1-35javascript

1/**

2 * PipeSessionSpawner — Spawns lightweight `claude -p` sessions for simple

3 * threadline queries. Sessions auto-exit when done, reducing zombie risk

4 * and session slot consumption.

5 *

6 * Part of RFC: Persistent Listener Daemon Architecture (Phase 2).

7 *

8 * Security model:

9 * - Messages wrapped in <untrusted-message> XML tags (injection-hardened)

10 * - Thread history LLM-summarized before injection (strips jailbreak assembly)

scripts/check-rule3-coverage.cjsView file

Lines 16-56javascript

16 * - tmux capture-pane / send-keys patterns

17 * - JSON.parse on subprocess stdout

18 * - new class

dist/commands/listener.jsView file

Lines 1-34javascript

1/**

2 * `instar listener` — Manage the standalone listener daemon.

3 *

4 * Commands:

5 * instar listener start — Start the listener daemon

6 * instar listener stop — Gracefully stop the daemon

7 * instar listener status — Show daemon state + connection info

8 * instar listener logs — Tail daemon log file

9 * instar listener restart — Graceful restart

10 * instar listener doctor — Pre-flight check

skills/spec-converge/scripts/publish-spec-review.mjsView file

Lines 1-40javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2/**

3 * publish-spec-review.mjs — the sanctioned way to deliver a spec for review.

4 *

5 * Structure > Willpower: sending a spec for review WITHOUT a rendered,

6 * verified ELI16 tunnel link should be impossible, not something the agent

7 * remembers to attach. This script makes the correct delivery atomic:

8 *

9 * 1. Resolve the spec's ELI16 companion using the SAME convention the

10 * commit-time gate enforces (scripts/eli16-overview-check.mjs).

dist/messaging/TelegramAdapter.jsView file

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/messaging/TelegramAdapter.js: fs.writeFileSync(tmpPath, JSON.stringify(config, null, 2)); fs.writeFileSync(tmpPath, JSON.stringify({ messageId, savedAt: new Date().toISOString() })); fs.writeFileSync(tmpPath, JSON.stringify(config, null, 2)); * Public read-only authorization check for a sender id (Know Your Principal #898, fs.writeFileSync(destPath, buffer); baseUrl: 'https://api.groq.com/openai/v1', baseUrl: 'https://api.openai.com/v1', return { apiKey, baseUrl: p.baseUrl, model: p.model };

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/messaging/TelegramAdapter.jsView on unpkg

dist/core/GitSync.jsView file

Lines 1-32javascript

1/**

2 * Git-based state synchronization for multi-machine coordination.

3 *

4 * Handles:

5 * - Configuring git commit signing with machine Ed25519 keys

6 * - Commit signing verification on pull

7 * - Debounced auto-commit + push

8 * - Relationship merge with field-level resolution

9 * - Conflict resolution strategies

10 *

11 * Part of Phase 3 (state sync via git).

dist/commands/setup.jsView file

Lines 1-37javascript

1/**

2 * Interactive setup wizard — the one-line onboarding experience.

3 *

4 * `npx instar` or `instar setup` walks through everything:

5 * 1. Project detection + naming

6 * 2. Secret management (Bitwarden / local encrypted / manual)

7 * 3. Telegram setup (primary communication channel)

8 * 4. User setup (name, email, permissions)

9 * 5. Scheduler + first job (optional)

10 * 6. Start server

dist/core/PostUpdateMigrator.jsView file

•path = dist/core/PostUpdateMigrator.js kind = trigger_reachable_excluded_payload sizeBytes = 1343900 triggerReachableSource = dist/core/PostUpdateMigrator.js excludedPayload = .claude/hooks/free-text-guard.sh

Critical

Trigger Reachable Excluded Directory Payload

A package entrypoint or install-reachable source explicitly loads and activates an executable-looking payload from a test, fixture, or hidden path.

dist/core/PostUpdateMigrator.jsView on unpkg

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. w); if (current.includes(anyrow) && start >= 0 && end > start) { current = current.replace(anyrow, subscription_signin_skill_content.slice(start, end) + anyrow); changes.push('three failure-table rows'); } } if (changes.length === 0) { if (!current.includes(marker) || !current.includes(rowsmarker)) { result.skipped.push('skills/subscription-signin/skill.md: customized — left untouched (no cross-machine section)'); } return; } fs.writefilesync(skillfile, current); result.upgraded.pus

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

dist/core/PostUpdateMigrator.jsView on unpkg

scripts/run-contract-tests.jsView file

39try { L40: execSync('npx vitest run --config vitest.contract.config.ts', { L41: cwd: ROOT,

High

Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

scripts/run-contract-tests.jsView on unpkg · L39

.claude/hooks/free-text-guard.shView file

•path = .claude/hooks/free-text-guard.sh kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 3888 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Payload In Excluded Dir

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

.claude/hooks/free-text-guard.shView on unpkg

•path = .claude/hooks/free-text-guard.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 3888 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

.claude/hooks/free-text-guard.shView on unpkg

dist/commands/devPreflight.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 82

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/commands/devPreflight.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

dist/commands/server.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = instar@1.3.1343 matchedIdentity = npm:aW5zdGFy:1.3.1343 similarity = 0.942 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/commands/server.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

18 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/fix-better-sqlite3.cjs

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

dist/threadline/PipeSessionSpawner.jsView file

15*/ L16: import { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; L17: import fs from 'node:fs';

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/threadline/PipeSessionSpawner.jsView on unpkg · L15

352// Spawn tmux session, recording its incarnation (session id + pane pid) L353: const created = execSync(`tmux new-session -d -P -F '#{session_id} #{pane_pid}' -s "${sessionName}" -x 200 -y 50 'bash -c "${shellCmd.replace(/"/g, '\\"')}"'`, { timeout: 10_000, e... L354: const [tmuxId, panePid] = created.split(' ');

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

Findings

4 Critical11 High6 Medium5 Low

CriticalPersistence Backdoordist/core/GitSync.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/core/GitSync.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Excluded Directory Payloaddist/core/PostUpdateMigrator.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/commands/server.js

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighChild Processdist/threadline/PipeSessionSpawner.js

HighShelldist/threadline/PipeSessionSpawner.js

HighSame File Env Network Executionskills/spec-converge/scripts/publish-spec-review.mjs

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/messaging/TelegramAdapter.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/commands/setup.js

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to instar@1.3.1348.

See all versions of instar for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of instar@1.3.1348 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-13 07:46:43.221Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code