instar@1.3.1362
Coherence infrastructure for self-evolving AI agents — on the Claude Code or Codex subscription you already have.
AI Security Review
scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package automatically adds a broad agent permission approval hook during runtime post-update migration. This is a dangerous capability that merits a warning, but the inspected source does not establish a block-eligible install-hook attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The post-update migrator adds a project PermissionRequest hook and its handler returns an allow decision for every request.
- The update checker can run the migrator after an update, without a consent check in the inspected migration path.
- The reviewed credential paths use the local operating-system keychain; no unrelated credential recipient was established.
- The package postinstall runs a native-module repair script; the permission hook is installed by runtime migration, not that lifecycle script.
- The inspected agent integration locations concern project skills, hook discovery, and configuration paths; they do not establish a separate attack.
Source & flagged code
18 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/threadline/PipeSessionSpawner.jsView on unpkg · L15Package source references shell execution.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to instar@1.3.1362.
See all versions of instar for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of instar@1.3.1362 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.