instar@1.3.1420
⚠ Under reviewCoherence infrastructure for self-evolving AI agents — on the Claude Code or Codex subscription you already have.
AI Security Review
scanned 1h ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no concrete attack in the reviewed install, telemetry, and credential paths. A clean verdict requires citation coverage beyond the output limit, so the review remains unresolved.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest runs a SQLite native-module repair after installation; the helper downloads a versioned better-sqlite3 release and extracts it into that dependency.
- Telemetry sends host and usage metadata only when enabled; the server constructor defaults telemetry to disabled.
- The inspected OAuth and quota code uses Claude credential flows and a bearer token for the provider usage request.
- The inspected sources do not establish a concrete attack or unconsented credential transfer.
- The required clean-review citation set exceeds the output limit, preventing a fully covered clean verdict.
Source & flagged code
29 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/threadline/PipeSessionSpawner.jsView on unpkg · L15Package source references shell execution.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to instar@1.3.1420.
See all versions of instar for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of instar@1.3.1420 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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