internal-renderers@10.0.0
Defensive placeholder. Benign beacon only (single HTTP GET to researcher server), no functional code. Held to prevent dependency-confusion abuse of an internal workspace package name exposed in a public repository. Will be transferred to the owning organi
AI Security Review
scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiBoth lifecycle hooks automatically transmit the username, hostname, and working directory to a hard-coded external IP. This is install-time data exfiltration, regardless of the package’s stated placeholder purpose.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The preinstall hook sends the username, hostname, and working directory to a hard-coded external IP address.
- The postinstall hook repeats the same data transfer to that IP address.
- The README confirms the install scripts send those fields to a researcher server.
- The README describes the package as a defensive placeholder intended to protect an internal package name.
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedInstall-time lifecycle script matches a deterministic static-gate block pattern.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script matches a deterministic static-gate block pattern.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to internal-renderers@10.0.0.
See all versions of internal-renderers for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing internal-renderers@10.0.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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