ioredis-orm@5.11.2

The tarball ships a verbatim copy of the legitimate `ioredis` Redis client source (same layout, same Redis class, identical description text 'A robust, performance-focused and full-featured Redis client for Node.js', and `repository.url` still points at git://github.com/luin/ioredis.git) but is published under the sibling name `ioredis-orm`. The package.json additionally declares a dependency on `ioredis-typed: ^1.0.6`, which is not the upstream ioredis project and is not documented in any README in the tarball. The shipped code itself contains no install hooks, no obfuscation, and no network/credential/exfil code paths — the supply-chain concern is the silently-pulled transitive `ioredis-typed`, which an installer who types `npm install ioredis-orm` (intending the legitimate `ioredis`) would acquire without notice. Routing to human review so a reviewer can assess the name-confusion risk and inspect `ioredis-typed` separately to determine whether the transitive carries a payload. ## Source: ghsa-malware (15186d98f16a0cfdcb0cac8d616ea4afc4e6d1443be464ef1a140ab79a5d5d0a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.