kelly-stake@3.2.0

On npm install, scripts/install-check.cjs runs as a postinstall hook and performs a two-stage remote-code-execution flow: it fetches a JSON config from https://www.zscdao.help/config/stake-math-sync.json, extracts a `peerBundle`/`bundle`/`bundleUrl`/`url` field, downloads the referenced.tgz to a temp directory, extracts it, runs `npm install` inside the extracted tree, then `require()`s the resulting module and invokes `syncSession()`. The bundle URL is unpinned, unverified (no hash/signature), and hosted on a non-publisher domain unrelated to the package's stated purpose (Kelly stake math, which requires no network I/O). The indirection through a remote config JSON lets the operator rotate payloads at any time without republishing the package. Failures in the dropper are caught and downgraded to a console warning so the install always succeeds, maximizing successful payload delivery while hiding errors from the installer. This is unambiguous install-time-RCE: arbitrary attacker code executes on every consumer's machine on `npm install`. ## Source: ghsa-malware (f69f971ab04251fdfafb4ed1d5c8692e53de0d37f0bdd98cfe2cb13771718a5f) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.