---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/kurobails/v/1.3.8"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/kurobails/v/1.3.8.md"
package: "kurobails"
report_status: "published"
title: "kurobails@1.3.8 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "1.3.8"
---

# kurobails@1.3.8 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 17 findings warrant review before installing.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Unknown
- **Selected version:** 1.3.8
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The install hook only enforces the Node.js version, but the EVENT send path covertly adds a publisher-chosen newsletter attribution to messages. This is a real promotional side effect, though it is limited to an explicitly requested message and does not establish an automatic account action.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 78.0%
- **Started:** 2026-11-06T00:49:50.446Z
- **Finished:** 2026-11-06T00:50:40.318Z
- **Download time:** 260 ms
- **Static scan time:** 4235 ms
- **AI review time:** 45376 ms
- **Total time:** 49872 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** A user-requested event message is modified to carry a hard-coded publisher newsletter attribution.

- **Trigger:** The caller sends a message using the EVENT message type.

- **Impact:** Recipients may see publisher-chosen newsletter attribution attached to messages sent through the package.

- **Evidence paths:** lib/Socket/luxu.js, lib/Socket/messages-send.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-11-06T00:50:40.318Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The event helper inserts a fixed newsletter name and ID into forwardedNewsletterMessageInfo, then relays the message to the caller-supplied JID.

- **Rationale:** The install hook only enforces the Node.js version, but the EVENT send path covertly adds a publisher-chosen newsletter attribution to messages. This is a real promotional side effect, though it is limited to an explicitly requested message and does not establish an automatic account action.

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 78.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** Sending an EVENT message adds a publisher-named WhatsApp newsletter attribution with a hard-coded newsletter ID., The helper relays the constructed event message to the supplied recipient., The event helper is selected by the package's EVENT send path.

- **Evidence against:** The preinstall script only checks the Node.js major version; prepare is empty., The newsletter attribution is added inside an explicit message-send helper, not during import or startup.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to kurobails@1.3.8.

- Review the evidence and your use of kurobails@1.3.8 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/kurobails@1.3.8/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.preinstall = node ./engine-requirements.js
```

### 2. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. High: High Secret
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/kurobails@1.3.8/lib/WABinary/constants.js>)

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 600
```

### 5. Low: Weak Crypto
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 64.0%
- **Path:** lib/Utils/validate-connection.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/kurobails@1.3.8/lib/Utils/validate-connection.js>)

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L107: pull: false,
L108: devicePairingData: {
L109: buildHash: appVersionBuf,
...
L134: const { details, hmac, accountType } = proto.ADVSignedDeviceIdentityHMAC.decode(deviceIdentityNode.content);
L135: let hmacPrefix = Buffer.from([]);
L136: if (accountType !== undefined && accountType === proto.ADVEncryptionType.HOSTED) {
...
L158: ]);
L159: account.deviceSignature = Curve.sign(signedIdentityKey.private, deviceMsg);
L160: const identity = createSignalIdentity(lid, accountSignatureKey);
```

### 6. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 7. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 8. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 9. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 10. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/kurobails@1.3.8/WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```shell
path = WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 302
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 11. Medium: Oversized Source File
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** WAProto/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/kurobails@1.3.8/WAProto/index.js>)

Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
path = WAProto/index.js
kind = oversized_source_file
sizeBytes = 4435208
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 12. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 13. Medium: Git Dependency
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Package manifest contains a git dependency.

### 14. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** WAProto/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/kurobails@1.3.8/WAProto/index.js>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_path_work_budget_exceeded; limitedFiles = 4
```

### 15. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** lib/Utils/messages-media.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/kurobails@1.3.8/lib/Utils/messages-media.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = nishiki-bail@1.1.2
matchedPath = lib/Utils/messages-media.js
matchedIdentity = npm:bmlzaGlraS1iYWls:1.1.2
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 16. High: Secret Pattern
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/kurobails@1.3.8/lib/WABinary/constants.js>)

Google API key in lib/WABinary/constants.js

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 600
```

### 17. High: Secret Pattern
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.d.ts
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/kurobails@1.3.8/lib/WABinary/constants.d.ts>)

Google API key in lib/WABinary/constants.d.ts

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```typescript
patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 20
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** preinstall, prepare
- **Dependencies:** 13
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 4
- **Development dependencies:** 31
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 17

### Published dependency entries
- @cacheable/node-cache ^1.4.0 (Dependency)
- @hapi/boom ^9.1.3 (Dependency)
- async-mutex ^0.5.0 (Dependency)
- cache-manager ^7.2.8 (Dependency)
- chalk ^4.1.2 (Dependency)
- libsignal github:tenka-san/libsignal-node (Dependency)
- lru-cache ^11.1.0 (Dependency)
- music-metadata ^11.12.3 (Dependency)
- p-queue ^9.0.0 (Dependency)
- pino ^9.6 (Dependency)
- protobufjs ^7.5.6 (Dependency)
- whatsapp-rust-bridge 0.5.4 (Dependency)
- ws ^8.13.0 (Dependency)
- audio-decode ^2.1.3 (PeerDependency)
- jimp ^1.6.1 (PeerDependency)
- link-preview-js ^3.0.0 (PeerDependency)
- sharp \* (PeerDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** kurobails
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 1.3.8
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-06-17T17:48:57.733Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T18:58:37.767Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-06T00:50:49.522Z
- **Known versions:** 8
- **Latest version:** 2.0.3
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Whatsapp Sockets Baileys Modification By Z4ph
- **Author:** Z4ph
- **Maintainers:** zaphmention
- **Keywords:** whatsapp, automation, baileys, wa-bot, whatsapp api, whatsapp web, wa bot, whatsapp bot
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 219
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 7,262,164 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/kurobails/v/1.3.8>)
- [Repository](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/kurobails>)
