registry / laycot / 1.3.10

laycot@1.3.10

all pro layout cat visible smooth

AI Security Review

scanned 21d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

A normal import starts a detached loader. The loader downloads attacker-controlled code and executes it with Node module access.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Importing laycot's main entry point, or running its loader.

Impact

A remote endpoint can run arbitrary code with the importing user's Node permissions and leave a background process.

Mechanism

Detached process plus remote base64 payload execution through Function.

Attack narrative

When an application imports the package, index.js calls initialize. That function starts loader.js as a detached Node process and writes a PID file. The loader retrieves a JSON field named code from api.npoint.io, decodes it from base64, and passes it to Function with require and local path values. The endpoint therefore controls code that runs under the consumer's permissions.

AI rationale

This is a concrete import-triggered remote code execution and persistence mechanism, not a package-aligned utility. The absence of an install hook does not mitigate execution on ordinary import.

Evidence

index.jsinit.jsloader.js.pid

Network endpoints1

api.npoint.io/641d37178a880b1e8b8f

OSV advisory

This package is part of a malicious npm campaign published by the `laycot` account. Importing the package automatically launches a detached JavaScript loader that retrieves and executes additional code from npoint.io. The retrieved payload communicates with an attacker-controlled server and implements clipboard collection, keyboard and mouse event collection, filesystem scanning, and theft of Chrome extension storage. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (888eb7470e3887d76a6ecd9ccb3c635fac2e5c9c2726550b2047f7e52d6c6062) On import, index.js unconditionally calls initialize(), which spawns loader.js as a detached, unref'd, stdio-suppressed child process (windowsHide:true) and writes a.pid file to enforce singleton persistence. loader.js issues an HTTPS GET to https://api.npoint.io/641d37178a880b1e8b8f — a free anonymous JSON-hosting service whose content is fully mutable by whoever holds the bin's edit token — base64-decodes the `code` field of the JSON response, and executes it via `new Function('require','__dirname','__filename','module','exports', decodedCode)`, granting the fetched bytes full Node privileges including `require`. The package's declared identity is a cover story: package.json describes laycot as 'all pro layout cat visible smooth' with education/advanced-testing keywords, the README presents it as `runtime-utils`/`image-utils` with a fake `getProcessInfo` API, and the fetch URL is stored in a variable named `API_KEY` to obscure that it is an HTTP endpoint. The shipped code has no functionality matching any of these descriptions; its sole runtime behavior is the remote-fetch-and-eval loader.

laycot@1.3.10

AI Security Review

OSV advisory

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Source & flagged code