--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/leviathan-of-hashem/v/3.20.1" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/leviathan-of-hashem/v/3.20.1.md" package: "leviathan-of-hashem" report_status: "published" title: "leviathan-of-hashem@3.20.1 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "3.20.1" --- # leviathan-of-hashem@3.20.1 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 13 finding(s) warrant review before installing. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Staged Payload Carrier - **Selected version:** 3.20.1 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) The CLI fetches a mutable remote binary over HTTP and executes it. No integrity verification is present. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 96.0% - **Started:** 2026-08-27T18:03:43.280Z - **Finished:** 2026-08-27T18:04:25.630Z - **Download time:** 513 ms - **Static scan time:** 26 ms - **AI review time:** 41811 ms - **Total time:** 42350 ms ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The CLI fetches a mutable remote binary over HTTP and executes it. No integrity verification is present. - **Trigger:** A user runs any declared package CLI command. - **Impact:** A compromised or redirected download endpoint can supply code that runs with the invoking user's permissions. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, bin/run.js, bin/lvtn.js, bin/hachazal.js, bin/leviathantalon.js, leviathan-of-hashem-3.14.3.tgz - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-08-27T18:04:25.630Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Remote binary download, caching, and execution. - **Rationale:** This is a user-triggered staged payload carrier with an unverified HTTP binary update path. There is no install lifecycle hook, so the evidence supports a warning rather than a publish block. - **Files touched:** ~/.lvtn/bin/lvtn, ~/.lvtn/bin/version.txt - **Network endpoints:** http://5.78.43.130:3708/releases/cli ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 96.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for:** The user-invoked CLI downloads platform binaries from an HTTP IP address., Downloads follow arbitrary redirects and are written without a checksum or signature check., The downloaded cached binary is made executable and then launched., A download failure falls back to installing and trusting a pip package. - **Evidence against:** package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook., The behavior is reached through declared CLI commands, not during package installation. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** bin/run.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L11: const path = require("path"); L12: const { spawn, execSync } = require("child_process"); L13: ``` ### 2. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** bin/run.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L124: try { L125: execSync(`powershell -Command "Unblock-File -Path '${BIN_PATH}'"`, { stdio: "ignore" }); L126: } catch (_) {} ``` ### 3. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 4. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 5. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 6. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** bin/run.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L7: L8: const https = require("https"); L9: const http = require("http"); ... L11: const path = require("path"); L12: const { spawn, execSync } = require("child_process"); L13: L14: const BASE = process.env.LVTN_BINARY_BASE || "http://5.78.43.130:3708/releases/cli"; L15: const CACHE_DIR = process.env.LVTN_CACHE_DIR || ``` ### 7. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** bin/run.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L7: L8: const https = require("https"); L9: const http = require("http"); ... L11: const path = require("path"); L12: const { spawn, execSync } = require("child_process"); L13: L14: const BASE = process.env.LVTN_BINARY_BASE || "http://5.78.43.130:3708/releases/cli"; L15: const CACHE_DIR = process.env.LVTN_CACHE_DIR || ... L17: ? path.join(process.env.XDG_CACHE_HOME, "lvtn", "bin") L18: : path.join(require("os").homedir(), ".lvtn", "bin")); L19: const BIN_NAME = process.platform === "win32" ? "lvtn.exe" : "lvtn"; L20: const BIN_PATH = path.join(CACHE_DIR, BIN_NAME); ``` ### 8. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 9. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 10. Medium: Ships Compressed Blob - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** leviathan-of-hashem-3.14.3.tgz - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships compressed or archive-like blobs. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = leviathan-of-hashem-3.14.3.tgz kind = compressed_blob sizeBytes = 2500 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 11. Low: Nested Archive Needs Inspection - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 80.0% - **Path:** leviathan-of-hashem-3.14.3.tgz - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships a nested archive or MCP bundle that was inventoried but not recursively analyzed. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = leviathan-of-hashem-3.14.3.tgz kind = nested_archive_needs_inspection sizeBytes = 2500 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 12. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 13. Low: No License - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest does not declare a clear license. ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 0 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0 ## Package metadata - **Package:** leviathan-of-hashem - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 3.20.1 - **License:** Proprietary - **Version published:** 2026-08-27T17:54:43.011Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-27T18:04:25.630Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-09-01T00:39:32.875Z - **Known versions:** 7 - **Latest version:** 3.20.9 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Leviathan Shel HaShem — the 708-agent Kabbalistic swarm in your terminal. Self-contained binary, no Python/Node deps. - **Author:** HaChazal - **Maintainers:** hachazal - **Keywords:** agent, swarm, orchestration, kabbalah, metanoia, leviathan, cli, tui - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=14.0.0 - **Artifact files:** 7 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 9,957 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()