--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/llm-failover-proxy/v/1.10.0" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/llm-failover-proxy/v/1.10.0.md" package: "llm-failover-proxy" report_status: "published" title: "llm-failover-proxy@1.10.0 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "1.10.0" --- # llm-failover-proxy@1.10.0 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 21 finding(s) warrant review before installing. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Persistence - **Selected version:** 1.10.0 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. This is not proven malware, but automatic daemon startup and global login persistence are risky install-time behavior. The optional WARP routing is a dangerous dual-use capability explicitly intended to work around rate limits. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 88.0% - **Started:** 2026-08-26T14:39:45.005Z - **Finished:** 2026-08-26T14:41:04.209Z - **Download time:** 506 ms - **Static scan time:** 1347 ms - **AI review time:** 77349 ms - **Total time:** 79204 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Installing the package starts its proxy in the background. A global install also creates a per-user login entry; the separately invoked WARP feature downloads tunnel executables for rate-limit bypass. - **Trigger:** npm install starts the daemon; a global install enables login startup; a user invokes the WARP feature to download tunnel tools. - **Impact:** The package can leave a background process and user-level startup entry after installation, and its optional network tunnel can be used to evade provider rate limits. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall.js, scripts/preuninstall.js, dist/index.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-08-26T14:41:04.209Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Install-time daemon startup, login persistence, and optional verified remote tunnel binaries. - **Rationale:** This is not proven malware, but automatic daemon startup and global login persistence are risky install-time behavior. The optional WARP routing is a dangerous dual-use capability explicitly intended to work around rate limits. - **Files touched:** scripts/postinstall.js, scripts/preuninstall.js, dist/index.js - **Network endpoints:** https://github.com, https://www.cloudflare.com ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 88.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** The install hook starts a background daemon on ordinary installs and runs enable for global installs., Global enable writes an operating-system login entry for the proxy., The optional WARP feature downloads and runs third-party tunnel binaries, supporting rate-limit bypass. - **Evidence against:** The lifecycle hook skips npx, source checkouts, CI, and an explicit opt-out setting., The uninstall hook invokes disable to remove the service., Downloaded WARP files are checked against published checksums before being written., No source evidence shows credential harvesting or exfiltration. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to llm-failover-proxy@1.10.0. - Review the evidence and your use of llm-failover-proxy@1.10.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js ``` ### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 4. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 5. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L8: `),Ah=/^\s*(?:export\s+)?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*=(.*)$/,jd=new Set,Wd={}});import eb from"node:crypto";import li from"node:fs";import tb from"node:os";import Wn from"node:path"... L9: `,{mode:384}),li.renameSync(o,t);try{li.chmodSync(t,384)}catch{}return e.__file=t,t}function ah(e){let t=nh.warp,n=(m,Q)=>{let h=Math.trunc(Number(m));return Number.isFinite(h)&&h>... L10: `)),t}catch{return ia}}function yh(e){try{let{origin:t}=JSON.parse(nt.readFileSync(hh(e),"utf8"));return typeof t=="string"&&!nt.existsSync(t)}catch{return!1}}function sE(e){try{re... ``` ### 6. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% Package source references shell execution. ### 7. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 8. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 9. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L4: var FR=Object.create;var Pd=Object.defineProperty;var KR=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var JR=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var YR=Object.getPrototypeOf,zR=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr... L5: `).replace(/\\r/g,"\r").replace(/\\t/g," ").replace(/\\(["'\\])/g,"$1");if(t.length>=2&&t.startsWith("'")&&t.endsWith("'"))return t.slice(1,-1);let n=t.indexOf(" #");return(n===-1?... L6: `).trimEnd()} L7: `,{mode:384}),ta.renameSync(g,e);try{ta.chmodSync(e,384)}catch{}if(n)for(let[d,E]of i)process.env[d]=String(E),jd.add(d),Wd[d]=String(E);return{file:e,written:u}}var PR,Ah,jd,Wd,Sr... L8: `),Ah=/^\s*(?:export\s+)?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*=(.*)$/,jd=new Set,Wd={}});import eb from"node:crypto";import li from"node:fs";import tb from"node:os";import Wn from"node:path"... L9: `,{mode:384}),li.renameSyn ``` ### 10. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 11. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L4: var FR=Object.create;var Pd=Object.defineProperty;var KR=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var JR=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var YR=Object.getPrototypeOf,zR=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr... L5: `).replace(/\\r/g,"\r").replace(/\\t/g," ").replace(/\\(["'\\])/g,"$1");if(t.length>=2&&t.startsWith("'")&&t.endsWith("'"))return t.slice(1,-1);let n=t.indexOf(" #");return(n===-1?... L6: `).trimEnd()} ... L8: `),Ah=/^\s*(?:export\s+)?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*=(.*)$/,jd=new Set,Wd={}});import eb from"node:crypto";import li from"node:fs";import tb from"node:os";import Wn from"node:path"... L9: `,{mode:384}),li.renameSync(o,t);try{li.chmodSync(t,384)}catch{}return e.__file=t,t}function ah(e){let t=nh.warp,n=(m,Q)=>{let h=Math.trunc(Number(m));return Number.isFinite(h)&&h>... L10: `)),t}catch{return ia ``` ### 12. High: Entrypoint Foreign Package Code Overwrite - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-reachable source overwrites another installed package with package-defined remote behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-reachable source resolves another installed package, overwrites its runtime code, and injects package-defined remote behavior. dist/index.js: `).replace(/\\r/g,"\r").replace(/\\t/g," ").replace(/\\(["'\\])/g,"$1");if(t.length>=2&&t.startsWith("'")&&t.endsWith("'"))return t.slice(1,-1);let n=t.indexOf(" #");return(n===-1?... `),Ah=/^\s*(?:export\s+)?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*=(.*)$/,jd=new Set,Wd={}});import eb from"node:crypto";import li from"node:fs";import tb from"node:os";import Wn from"node:path"... `,{mode:384}),li.renameSync(o,t);try{li.chmodSync(t,384)}catch{}return e.__file=t,t}function ah(e){let t=nh.warp,n=(m,Q)=>{let h=Math.trunc(Number(m));return Number.isFinite(h)&&h>... `)),t}catch{return ia}}function yh(e){try{let{origin:t}=JSON.parse(nt.readFileSync(hh(e),"utf8")) ``` ### 13. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L8: `),Ah=/^\s*(?:export\s+)?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*=(.*)$/,jd=new Set,Wd={}});import eb from"node:crypto";import li from"node:fs";import tb from"node:os";import Wn from"node:path"... L9: `,{mode:384}),li.renameSync(o,t);try{li.chmodSync(t,384)}catch{}return e.__file=t,t}function ah(e){let t=nh.warp,n=(m,Q)=>{let h=Math.trunc(Number(m));return Number.isFinite(h)&&h>... L10: `)),t}catch{return ia}}function yh(e){try{let{origin:t}=JSON.parse(nt.readFileSync(hh(e),"utf8"));return typeof t=="string"&&!nt.existsSync(t)}catch{return!1}}function sE(e){try{re... L11: `)}catch{}return n}function gc(e,t=process.pid){let n=lE(e);if(n&&n.pid!==t)return!1;try{return nt.unlinkSync(dc(e)),!0}catch{return!1}}function Zn(e){if(!Number.isInteger(e)||e<=0... L12: `)}catch{return""}}async function Ec({con ``` ### 14. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 72.0% - **Path:** scripts/postinstall.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Cross-file remote execution chain: scripts/postinstall.js spawns dist/index.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L9: */ L10: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L11: import fs from "node:fs"; ... L30: const terminal = (() => { L31: const target = process.platform === "win32" ? "CONOUT$" : "/dev/tty"; L32: let fd = null; ... L48: const line = `${text}\n`; L49: if (terminal === null) return void process.stdout.write(line); L50: try { ... L59: L60: const isGlobal = process.env.npm[redacted] === "true"; L61: const isNpx = process.env.npm_command === "exec" || packageDir.includes("_npx"); ``` ### 15. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js L8: `),Ah=/^\s*(?:export\s+)?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*=(.*)$/,jd=new Set,Wd={}});import eb from"node:crypto";import li from"node:fs";import tb from"node:os";import Wn from"node:path"... L9: `,{mode:384}),li.renameSync(o,t);try{li.chmodSync(t,384)}catch{}return e.__file=t,t}function ah(e){let t=nh.warp,n=(m,Q)=>{let h=Math.trunc(Number(m));return Number.isFinite(h)&&h>... L10: `)),t}catch{return ia}}function yh(e){try{let{origin:t}=JSON.parse(nt.readFileSync(hh(e),"utf8"));return typeof t=="string"&&!nt.existsSync(t)}catch{return!1}}function sE(e){try{re... L11: `)}catch{}return n}function gc(e,t=process.pid){let n=lE(e);if(n&&n.pid!==t)return!1;try{return nt.unlinkSync(dc(e)),!0}catch{return!1}}function Zn ``` ### 16. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js L4: var FR=Object.create;var Pd=Object.defineProperty;var KR=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var JR=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var YR=Object.getPrototypeOf,zR=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr... L5: `).replace(/\\r/g,"\r").replace(/\\t/g," ").replace(/\\(["'\\])/g,"$1");if(t.length>=2&&t.startsWith("'")&&t.endsWith("'"))return t.slice(1,-1);let n=t.indexOf(" #");return(n===-1?... L6: `).trimEnd()} L7: `,{mode:384}),ta.renameSync(g,e);try{ta.chmodSync(e,384)}catch{}if(n)for(let[d,E]of i)process.env[d]=String(E),jd.add(d),Wd[d]=String(E);return{file:e,written:u}}var PR,Ah,jd,Wd,Sr... L8: `),Ah=/^\s*(?:export\s+)?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*=(.*)$/,jd=new Set,Wd={}});import eb from"node:crypto";import li from"node:fs";import tb from"n ``` ### 17. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 18. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 19. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 80.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 20. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** scripts/postinstall.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = llm-failover-proxy@1.3.0 matchedPath = scripts/postinstall.js matchedIdentity = npm:bGxtLWZhaWxvdmVyLXByb3h5:1.3.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 21. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = llm-failover-proxy@1.9.1 matchedIdentity = npm:bGxtLWZhaWxvdmVyLXByb3h5:1.9.1 similarity = 0.750 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, preuninstall - **Dependencies:** 0 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 4 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0 ## Package metadata - **Package:** llm-failover-proxy - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.10.0 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-08-26T11:04:57.866Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-11T04:06:41.733Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-09-08T18:39:21.580Z - **Known versions:** 14 - **Latest version:** 1.11.0 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** OpenAI-compatible LLM proxy with automatic provider failover, streaming support, and a terminal UI to manage providers, models and priority order. - **Author:** Antoine Joly - **Maintainers:** antoinej21 - **Keywords:** llm, openai, openai-compatible, proxy, gateway, failover, fallback, streaming, sse, anthropic, openrouter, ollama - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22 - **Artifact files:** 8 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 691,863 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** Yes - **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()