--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/llm-failover-proxy/v/1.9.1" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/llm-failover-proxy/v/1.9.1.md" package: "llm-failover-proxy" report_status: "published" title: "llm-failover-proxy@1.9.1 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "1.9.1" --- # llm-failover-proxy@1.9.1 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 23 finding(s) warrant review before installing. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Persistence - **Selected version:** 1.9.1 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. This is a real install-time persistence capability, so warning is appropriate. The source supports a package-aligned local proxy rather than concrete malicious behavior. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 86.0% - **Started:** 2026-08-25T15:58:37.498Z - **Finished:** 2026-08-25T15:59:24.160Z - **Download time:** 502 ms - **Static scan time:** 1253 ms - **AI review time:** 44904 ms - **Total time:** 46662 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** npm postinstall starts a detached local proxy; global installation additionally creates login persistence. No confirmed credential exfiltration or remote payload execution was found. - **Trigger:** npm install; global installs select the enable path - **Impact:** A background process starts without an explicit runtime command and may persist across login for global installs. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall.js, scripts/preuninstall.js, dist/index.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-08-25T15:59:24.160Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** install-time daemon launch and user-session autostart registration - **Rationale:** This is a real install-time persistence capability, so warning is appropriate. The source supports a package-aligned local proxy rather than concrete malicious behavior. - **Files touched:** scripts/postinstall.js, scripts/preuninstall.js, dist/index.js, package.json - **Network endpoints:** https://registry.npmjs.org/-/package/llm-failover-proxy/dist-tags ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** postinstall unconditionally invokes daemon/enable unless opt-out or CI., Global installs invoke enable, which writes and activates user login persistence., The daemon is detached and runs the package entrypoint in the background. - **Evidence against:** Persistence is explicitly package-named and removed by preuninstall., No source evidence of credential harvesting or exfiltration to an attacker-controlled endpoint., Observed registry request is an opt-out-able npm update check. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to llm-failover-proxy@1.9.1. - Review the evidence and your use of llm-failover-proxy@1.9.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js ``` ### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 4. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 5. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L8: `),$C=/^\s*(?:export\s+)?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*=(.*)$/,Pd=new Set,jd={}});import VR from"node:crypto";import li from"node:fs";import XR from"node:os";import Wn from"node:path"... L9: `,{mode:384}),li.renameSync(o,t);try{li.chmodSync(t,384)}catch{}return e.__file=t,t}function rh(e){let t=eh.warp,n=(m,Q)=>{let h=Math.trunc(Number(m));return Number.isFinite(h)&&h>... L10: `)),t}catch{return ia}}function Ch(e){try{let{origin:t}=JSON.parse(At.readFileSync(Ih(e),"utf8"));return typeof t=="string"&&!At.existsSync(t)}catch{return!1}}function aE(e){try{re... ``` ### 6. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% Package source references shell execution. ### 7. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 8. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 9. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L4: var GR=Object.create;var qd=Object.defineProperty;var LR=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var OR=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var HR=Object.getPrototypeOf,FR=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr... L5: `).replace(/\\r/g,"\r").replace(/\\t/g," ").replace(/\\(["'\\])/g,"$1");if(t.length>=2&&t.startsWith("'")&&t.endsWith("'"))return t.slice(1,-1);let n=t.indexOf(" #");return(n===-1?... L6: `).trimEnd()} L7: `,{mode:384}),ta.renameSync(g,e);try{ta.chmodSync(e,384)}catch{}if(n)for(let[d,E]of i)process.env[d]=String(E),Pd.add(d),jd[d]=String(E);return{file:e,written:u}}var JR,$C,Pd,jd,Sr... L8: `),$C=/^\s*(?:export\s+)?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*=(.*)$/,Pd=new Set,jd={}});import VR from"node:crypto";import li from"node:fs";import XR from"node:os";import Wn from"node:path"... L9: `,{mode:384}),li.renameSyn ``` ### 10. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 11. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L4: var GR=Object.create;var qd=Object.defineProperty;var LR=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var OR=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var HR=Object.getPrototypeOf,FR=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr... L5: `).replace(/\\r/g,"\r").replace(/\\t/g," ").replace(/\\(["'\\])/g,"$1");if(t.length>=2&&t.startsWith("'")&&t.endsWith("'"))return t.slice(1,-1);let n=t.indexOf(" #");return(n===-1?... L6: `).trimEnd()} ... L8: `),$C=/^\s*(?:export\s+)?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*=(.*)$/,Pd=new Set,jd={}});import VR from"node:crypto";import li from"node:fs";import XR from"node:os";import Wn from"node:path"... L9: `,{mode:384}),li.renameSync(o,t);try{li.chmodSync(t,384)}catch{}return e.__file=t,t}function rh(e){let t=eh.warp,n=(m,Q)=>{let h=Math.trunc(Number(m));return Number.isFinite(h)&&h>... L10: `)),t}catch{return ia ``` ### 12. Critical: Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L4: var GR=Object.create;var qd=Object.defineProperty;var LR=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var OR=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var HR=Object.getPrototypeOf,FR=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr... L5: `).replace(/\\r/g,"\r").replace(/\\t/g," ").replace(/\\(["'\\])/g,"$1");if(t.length>=2&&t.startsWith("'")&&t.endsWith("'"))return t.slice(1,-1);let n=t.indexOf(" #");return(n===-1?... L6: `).trimEnd()} L7: `,{mode:384}),ta.renameSync(g,e);try{ta.chmodSync(e,384)}catch{}if(n)for(let[d,E]of i)process.env[d]=String(E),Pd.add(d),jd[d]=String(E);return{file:e,written:u}}var JR,$C,Pd,jd,Sr... L8: `),$C=/^\s*(?:export\s+)?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*=(.*)$/,Pd=new Set,jd={}});import VR from"node:crypto";import li from"node:fs";import XR from"node:os";import Wn from"node:path"... L9: `,{mode:384}),li.renameSyn ``` ### 13. High: Entrypoint Foreign Package Code Overwrite - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-reachable source overwrites another installed package with package-defined remote behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-reachable source resolves another installed package, overwrites its runtime code, and injects package-defined remote behavior. dist/index.js: `).replace(/\\r/g,"\r").replace(/\\t/g," ").replace(/\\(["'\\])/g,"$1");if(t.length>=2&&t.startsWith("'")&&t.endsWith("'"))return t.slice(1,-1);let n=t.indexOf(" #");return(n===-1?... `),$C=/^\s*(?:export\s+)?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*=(.*)$/,Pd=new Set,jd={}});import VR from"node:crypto";import li from"node:fs";import XR from"node:os";import Wn from"node:path"... `,{mode:384}),li.renameSync(o,t);try{li.chmodSync(t,384)}catch{}return e.__file=t,t}function rh(e){let t=eh.warp,n=(m,Q)=>{let h=Math.trunc(Number(m));return Number.isFinite(h)&&h>... `)),t}catch{return ia}}function Ch(e){try{let{origin:t}=JSON.parse(At.readFileSync(Ih(e),"utf8")) ``` ### 14. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L8: `),$C=/^\s*(?:export\s+)?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*=(.*)$/,Pd=new Set,jd={}});import VR from"node:crypto";import li from"node:fs";import XR from"node:os";import Wn from"node:path"... L9: `,{mode:384}),li.renameSync(o,t);try{li.chmodSync(t,384)}catch{}return e.__file=t,t}function rh(e){let t=eh.warp,n=(m,Q)=>{let h=Math.trunc(Number(m));return Number.isFinite(h)&&h>... L10: `)),t}catch{return ia}}function Ch(e){try{let{origin:t}=JSON.parse(At.readFileSync(Ih(e),"utf8"));return typeof t=="string"&&!At.existsSync(t)}catch{return!1}}function aE(e){try{re... L11: `)}catch{}return n}function fc(e,t=process.pid){let n=sE(e);if(n&&n.pid!==t)return!1;try{return At.unlinkSync(gc(e)),!0}catch{return!1}}function Zn(e){if(!Number.isInteger(e)||e<=0... L12: `)}catch{return""}}async function dc({con ``` ### 15. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 72.0% - **Path:** scripts/postinstall.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Cross-file remote execution chain: scripts/postinstall.js spawns dist/index.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L9: */ L10: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L11: import fs from "node:fs"; ... L30: const terminal = (() => { L31: const target = process.platform === "win32" ? "CONOUT$" : "/dev/tty"; L32: let fd = null; ... L48: const line = `${text}\n`; L49: if (terminal === null) return void process.stdout.write(line); L50: try { ... L59: L60: const isGlobal = process.env.npm[redacted] === "true"; L61: const isNpx = process.env.npm_command === "exec" || packageDir.includes("_npx"); ``` ### 16. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js L4: var GR=Object.create;var qd=Object.defineProperty;var LR=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var OR=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var HR=Object.getPrototypeOf,FR=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr... L5: `).replace(/\\r/g,"\r").replace(/\\t/g," ").replace(/\\(["'\\])/g,"$1");if(t.length>=2&&t.startsWith("'")&&t.endsWith("'"))return t.slice(1,-1);let n=t.indexOf(" #");return(n===-1?... L6: `).trimEnd()} L7: `,{mode:384}),ta.renameSync(g,e);try{ta.chmodSync(e,384)}catch{}if(n)for(let[d,E]of i)process.env[d]=String(E),Pd.add(d),jd[d]=String(E);return{file:e,written:u}}var JR,$C,Pd,jd,Sr... L8: `),$C=/^\s*(?:export\s+)?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*=(.*)$/,Pd=new Set,jd={}});import VR from"node:crypto";import li from"node:fs";import XR from"node:os";impo ``` ### 17. High: Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js L4: var GR=Object.create;var qd=Object.defineProperty;var LR=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var OR=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var HR=Object.getPrototypeOf,FR=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr... L5: `).replace(/\\r/g,"\r").replace(/\\t/g," ").replace(/\\(["'\\])/g,"$1");if(t.length>=2&&t.startsWith("'")&&t.endsWith("'"))return t.slice(1,-1);let n=t.indexOf(" #");return(n===-1?... L6: `).trimEnd()} L7: `,{mode:384}),ta.renameSync(g,e);try{ta.chmodSync(e,384)}catch{}if(n)for(let[d,E]of i)process.env[d]=String(E),Pd.add(d),jd[d]=String(E);return{file:e,written:u}}var JR,$C,Pd,jd,Sr... L8: `),$C=/^\s*(?:export\s+)?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*=(.*)$/,Pd=new Set,jd={}});import VR from"node:crypto";import li from"node:fs";impo ``` ### 18. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js L8: `),$C=/^\s*(?:export\s+)?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*=(.*)$/,Pd=new Set,jd={}});import VR from"node:crypto";import li from"node:fs";import XR from"node:os";import Wn from"node:path"... L9: `,{mode:384}),li.renameSync(o,t);try{li.chmodSync(t,384)}catch{}return e.__file=t,t}function rh(e){let t=eh.warp,n=(m,Q)=>{let h=Math.trunc(Number(m));return Number.isFinite(h)&&h>... L10: `)),t}catch{return ia}}function Ch(e){try{let{origin:t}=JSON.parse(At.readFileSync(Ih(e),"utf8"));return typeof t=="string"&&!At.existsSync(t)}catch{return!1}}function aE(e){try{re... L11: `)}catch{}return n}function fc(e,t=process.pid){let n=sE(e);if(n&&n.pid!==t)return!1;try{return At.unlinkSync(gc(e)),!0}catch{return!1}}function Zn ``` ### 19. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js L4: var GR=Object.create;var qd=Object.defineProperty;var LR=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var OR=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var HR=Object.getPrototypeOf,FR=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr... L5: `).replace(/\\r/g,"\r").replace(/\\t/g," ").replace(/\\(["'\\])/g,"$1");if(t.length>=2&&t.startsWith("'")&&t.endsWith("'"))return t.slice(1,-1);let n=t.indexOf(" #");return(n===-1?... L6: `).trimEnd()} L7: `,{mode:384}),ta.renameSync(g,e);try{ta.chmodSync(e,384)}catch{}if(n)for(let[d,E]of i)process.env[d]=String(E),Pd.add(d),jd[d]=String(E);return{file:e,written:u}}var JR,$C,Pd,jd,Sr... L8: `),$C=/^\s*(?:export\s+)?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*=(.*)$/,Pd=new Set,jd={}});import VR from"node:crypto";import li from"node:fs";import XR from"n ``` ### 20. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 21. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 22. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 23. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** scripts/postinstall.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = llm-failover-proxy@1.3.0 matchedPath = scripts/postinstall.js matchedIdentity = npm:bGxtLWZhaWxvdmVyLXByb3h5:1.3.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, preuninstall - **Dependencies:** 0 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 4 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0 ## Package metadata - **Package:** llm-failover-proxy - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.9.1 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-08-25T12:24:51.503Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-11T04:06:41.733Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-09-08T18:39:21.580Z - **Known versions:** 14 - **Latest version:** 1.11.0 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** OpenAI-compatible LLM proxy with automatic provider failover, streaming support, and a terminal UI to manage providers, models and priority order. - **Author:** Antoine Joly - **Maintainers:** antoinej21 - **Keywords:** llm, openai, openai-compatible, proxy, gateway, failover, fallback, streaming, sse, anthropic, openrouter, ollama - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22 - **Artifact files:** 8 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 689,615 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** Yes - **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()