---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/llm-relay"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/llm-relay/v/0.69.1.md"
package: "llm-relay"
report_status: "published"
title: "llm-relay@0.69.1 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.69.1"
---

# llm-relay@0.69.1 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk
- **Selected version:** 0.69.1
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

LPM treats this as warn-only first-party agent extension lifecycle risk. A global npm installation automatically changes AI-agent configuration and installs skill files. It registers an MCP command that launches llm-relay through Codex.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 93.0%
- **Started:** 2026-09-04T08:50:12.672Z
- **Finished:** 2026-09-04T08:51:29.133Z
- **Download time:** 505 ms
- **Static scan time:** 3911 ms
- **AI review time:** 72044 ms
- **Total time:** 76461 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** A global npm installation automatically changes AI-agent configuration and installs skill files. It registers an MCP command that launches llm-relay through Codex.

- **Trigger:** npm global installation runs postinstall.

- **Impact:** The package can alter how installed AI-agent tools discover and invoke llm-relay without a separate setup command.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/install-skill.mjs

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-09-04T08:51:29.133Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** Lifecycle-driven agent configuration and skill installation.

- **Rationale:** The package is not proven malicious, but its automatic global postinstall modifies multiple AI-agent control surfaces and can provision Codex even when detection fails. This warrants a warning rather than a publication block under the lifecycle policy.

- **Files touched:** scripts/install-skill.mjs, ~/.codex/config.toml, ~/.codex/skills/llm-relay, ~/.claude/skills/llm-relay, $XDG\_CONFIG\_HOME/opencode/skills/llm-relay

- **Network endpoints:** http://127.0.0.1:8791/v1

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 93.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** Its npm postinstall automatically runs the skill installer., On global install, the installer adds a provider and MCP command to Codex configuration., The same lifecycle script copies skills into Claude Code, Codex, and OpenCode user configuration locations., If Codex detection fails, the script still provisions Codex configuration.

- **Evidence against:** The lifecycle script exits for ordinary local installs unless forced., The added configuration is limited to llm-relay-named sections and a loopback endpoint., No credential exfiltration or remote payload download was found in the inspected lifecycle code.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to llm-relay@0.69.1.

- Review the evidence and your use of llm-relay@0.69.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/llm-relay@0.69.1/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install-skill.mjs || node -e "process.stderr.write('llm-relay: the postinstall hook crashed, so the bundled host skills and Codex setup were NOT fully installed. The p...
```

### 2. Critical: Red Install Lifecycle Script
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 95.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/llm-relay@0.69.1/package.json>)

Install-time lifecycle script matches a deterministic static-gate block pattern.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install-skill.mjs || node -e "process.stderr.write('llm-relay: the postinstall hook crashed, so the bundled host skills and Codex setup were NOT fully installed. The p...
```

### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 4. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 5. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 6. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 7. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 8. Critical: Ai Agent Control Hijack
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** scripts/install-skill.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/llm-relay@0.69.1/scripts/install-skill.mjs>)

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L8: * so that a repo-local `npm install` (dev checkout, CI) never touches the developer's
L9: * ~/.claude, ~/.codex or the XDG config dir. Because the self-updater reinstalls the global
L10: * package on a new version, every host's skill description and the missing Codex setup refresh
...
L22: */
L23: import { copyFileSync, mkdirSync, existsSync, readFileSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
L24: import { join, dirname } from "node:path";
...
L79: if (!existsSync(configPath)) {
L80: writeFileSync(configPath, CODEX_PROVIDER_BLOCK, "utf8");
L81: return "configured";
...
L92: }
L93: writeFileSync(configPath, `${current}${separator}${CODEX_PROVIDER_BLOCK}`, "utf8");
L94: return "configured";
```

### 9. High: Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/claude-hook.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/llm-relay@0.69.1/dist/claude-hook.js>)

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation.
import { relaystatepath } from "./state-paths.js";
import { existssync, mkdirsync, readfilesync, writefilesync } from "node:fs";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { homedir, tmpdir } from "node:os";
export const agent_hook_filename = "llm-relay-agent-offload.mjs";
export function claudehookpaths(home = homedir()) {
    if (process.env.vitest && home === homedir()) {
        const vitesthome = join(tmpdir(), "llm-relay-vitest");
        return {
            settings: join(vitesthome, ".claude", "settings.json"),
            script: join(vitesthome, "hooks", agent_hook_filename),
        };
    }
    return {
        settings: join(home, ".claude", "settings.json"),
```

### 10. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 11. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 12. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 13. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** dist/config.js\#virtual:normalized:round1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/llm-relay@0.69.1/dist/config.js%23virtual%3Anormalized%3Around1>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 4
```

### 14. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/self-update.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/llm-relay@0.69.1/dist/self-update.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = llm-relay@0.62.0
matchedPath = dist/self-update.js
matchedIdentity = npm:bGxtLXJlbGF5:0.62.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 15. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/lane-quota-probe.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/llm-relay@0.69.1/dist/lane-quota-probe.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = llm-relay@0.62.0
matchedPath = dist/lane-quota-probe.js
matchedIdentity = npm:bGxtLXJlbGF5:0.62.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 16. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/os-keyring.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/llm-relay@0.69.1/dist/os-keyring.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = llm-relay@0.62.0
matchedPath = dist/os-keyring.js
matchedIdentity = npm:bGxtLXJlbGF5:0.62.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 17. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/winenv.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/llm-relay@0.69.1/dist/winenv.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = llm-relay@0.62.0
matchedPath = dist/winenv.js
matchedIdentity = npm:bGxtLXJlbGF5:0.62.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 18. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** scripts/sync-tiers.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/llm-relay@0.69.1/scripts/sync-tiers.mjs>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = llm-relay@0.62.0
matchedPath = scripts/sync-tiers.mjs
matchedIdentity = npm:bGxtLXJlbGF5:0.62.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 19. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/accounting-store-schema.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/llm-relay@0.69.1/dist/accounting-store-schema.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = llm-relay@0.68.5
matchedPath = dist/accounting-store-schema.js
matchedIdentity = npm:bGxtLXJlbGF5:0.68.5
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 20. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/dashboard-routes.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/llm-relay@0.69.1/dist/dashboard-routes.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = llm-relay@0.62.0
matchedPath = dist/dashboard-routes.js
matchedIdentity = npm:bGxtLXJlbGF5:0.62.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 21. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/reshaper.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/llm-relay@0.69.1/dist/reshaper.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = llm-relay@0.62.0
matchedPath = dist/reshaper.js
matchedIdentity = npm:bGxtLXJlbGF5:0.62.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepublishOnly
- **Dependencies:** 3
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 29
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 3

### Published dependency entries
- ajv ^8.17.1 (Dependency)
- llm-bridge ^2.0.1 (Dependency)
- typescript ^5.7.2 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** llm-relay
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.69.1
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-09-04T08:46:15.828Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-07-28T18:45:36.121Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-09-22T01:22:51.461Z
- **Known versions:** 87
- **Latest version:** 0.86.0
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Loopback bidirectional Anthropic/OpenAI API proxy with tool-call validation and multi-provider routing.
- **Deprecated:** Retired 2026-09-23; no longer maintained.
- **Maintainers:** wheatiest
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22
- **Artifact files:** 386
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 4,820,489 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/llm-relay/v/0.69.1>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/OhOkThisIsFine/llm-relay>)
- [Homepage](<https://github.com/OhOkThisIsFine/llm-relay#readme>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/OhOkThisIsFine/llm-relay/issues>)