Loading npm security reports…

mandrel@2.47.0: AI-agent control-surface risk | LPM Firewall

registry / mandrel / 2.47.0

mandrel@2.47.0

Claude Code-first opinionated workflow framework: instructions, skills, rules, and SDLC workflows that govern AI coding assistants.

AI Security Review

scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. Installation automatically materializes the package's AI-agent payload into the consumer project's .agents directory. It overwrites payload files and removes stale managed files without an explicit user command.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm installation with lifecycle scripts enabled.

Impact

A dependency install can replace agent instructions, skills, rules, and workflow files in the consumer project.

Mechanism

Postinstall copies and prunes a consumer AI-agent control surface.

Policy narrative

The package declares postinstall, which invokes code that resolves INIT_CWD as the consumer root. That code calls the sync routine, which copies the packaged .agents payload into the consumer project and deletes managed destination files absent from the payload. Because .agents is an AI-agent control surface and this occurs automatically during dependency installation, it is an unconsented broad control-surface mutation.

AI rationale

The automatic postinstall mutation of a consumer AI-agent control surface meets the blocking policy. No network activity is needed for this concrete install-time control-surface takeover.

Evidence

package.jsonbin/postinstall.jslib/cli/sync.js.agents/

Decision evidence

public snapshot

Source & flagged code

9 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/postinstall.js mandrel sync

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/postinstall.js mandrel sync

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

.agents/scripts/lib/qa/redact-evidence.jsView file

53patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 53

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

.agents/scripts/lib/qa/redact-evidence.jsView on unpkg · L53

bin/mandrel.jsView file

120function installedVersion() { L121: const req = createRequire(import.meta.url); L122: const manifest = req('../package.json');

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

bin/mandrel.jsView on unpkg · L120

bin/postinstall.jsView file

1Install-time AI-agent control hijack evidence: Install-time helper chain writes an AI-agent control surface: L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: // bin/postinstall.js — best-effort `.agents/` materializer on install. L3: ... L7: * Runs `mandrel sync` to materialize the package payload into the consumer's L8: * `./.agents/` working copy. This hook is **best-effort by contract** (Tech L9: * Spec #3459 "Postinstall safety", Feature #3461): it MUST exit 0 even when ... L16: * `mandrel sync` itself does: no network, no shell, no writes outside L17: * `./.agents/`. L18: * L19: * **Source-checkout guard (Story #3489, fixed in #3580).** In the Mandrel L20: * framework repo itself, `./.agents/` is not a regenerated working copy — it L21: * *is* the committed product, and `mandrel sync` would clobber that

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

bin/postinstall.jsView on unpkg · L1

lib/cli/init.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 4

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

lib/cli/init.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

lib/cli/registry.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = mandrel@2.43.0 matchedPath = lib/cli/registry.js matchedIdentity = npm:bWFuZHJlbA:2.43.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

lib/cli/registry.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 95984b0812a5190b signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = mandrel@2.43.0 matchedPath = lib/cli/registry.js matchedIdentity = npm:bWFuZHJlbA:2.43.0 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 14 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

lib/cli/registry.jsView on unpkg

lib/cli/update.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = mandrel@2.43.0 matchedPath = lib/cli/update.js matchedIdentity = npm:bWFuZHJlbA:2.43.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

lib/cli/update.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

9 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 47-87json

47 "check:context-budget": "node .agents/scripts/check-context-budget.js",

48 "check:cyclomatic": "node .agents/scripts/check-cyclomatic.js",

49 "cyclomatic:update": "node .agents/scripts/check-cyclomatic.js --update",

50 "dead-exports:update": "node .agents/scripts/update-dead-exports-baseline.js && node .agents/scripts/update-dead-exports-baseline.js --production",

51 "check:knip-entries": "node .agents/scripts/check-knip-entries.js",

52 "validator:gen": "node .agents/scripts/check-generated-validator.js",

53 "validator:check": "node .agents/scripts/check-generated-validator.js --check",

54 "check:schema-refs": "node .agents/scripts/check-schema-references.js",

55 "check:workflow-citations": "node .agents/scripts/check-workflow-citations.js",

56 "crap:check": "node .agents/scripts/check-baselines.js --gate crap",

57 "crap:update": "node .agents/scripts/update-crap-baseline.js",

58 "crap:reanchor": "node .agents/scripts/update-crap-baseline.js --full-scope",

59 "duplication:check": "node .agents/scripts/check-baselines.js --gate duplication",

60 "duplication:update": "node .agents/scripts/update-duplication-baseline.js",

61 "duplication:reanchor": "node .agents/scripts/update-duplication-baseline.js --full-scope",

62 "quality:preview": "node .agents/scripts/check-dead-exports.js && node .agents/scripts/quality-preview.js",

63 "quality:watch": "node .agents/scripts/quality-watch.js",

64 "sync:commands": "node bin/mandrel.js sync-commands",

65 "sync:agents": "node .agents/scripts/sync-claude-agents.js",

66 "prepare": "husky && npm run sync:commands && npm run sync:agents",

67 "postinstall": "node bin/postinstall.js mandrel sync"

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L67

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L67

68 },

69 "repository": {

70 "type": "git",

71 "url": "git+https://github.com/dsj1984/mandrel.git"

72 },

73 "keywords": [

74 "claude-code",

75 "ai-agents",

76 "sdlc",

77 "workflow",

78 "orchestration",

79 "agentic"

80 ],

81 "author": "",

82 "license": "MIT",

83 "bin": {

84 "mandrel": "./bin/mandrel.js"

85 },

86 "type": "module",

87 "bugs": {

.agents/scripts/lib/qa/redact-evidence.jsView file

Lines 33-73javascript

33 * unchanged, so benign evidence is never mangled.

34 *

35 * Each placeholder is distinct per rule so a reader of the redacted evidence

36 * can still tell *what kind* of secret was scrubbed without seeing its value.

37 */

bin/mandrel.jsView file

Lines 100-140javascript

100 },

101 ],

102 [

103 'uninstall',

104 {

105 description: 'reverse a recorded install using the install ledger',

106 knownFlags: new Set(['--include-github', '--dry-run']),

bin/postinstall.jsView file

Lines 1-21javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2// bin/postinstall.js — best-effort `.agents/` materializer on install.

3

4/**

5 * Published-package `postinstall` hook.

6 *

7 * Runs `mandrel sync` to materialize the package payload into the consumer's

8 * `./.agents/` working copy. This hook is **best-effort by contract** (Tech

9 * Spec #3459 "Postinstall safety", Feature #3461): it MUST exit 0 even when

10 * the sync fails, so that `--ignore-scripts` installs, sandboxed CI, or a

11 * transient copy error degrade to the `mandrel doctor`-detected

lib/cli/init.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 4

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

lib/cli/init.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

lib/cli/registry.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = mandrel@2.43.0 matchedPath = lib/cli/registry.js matchedIdentity = npm:bWFuZHJlbA:2.43.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

lib/cli/registry.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 95984b0812a5190b signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = mandrel@2.43.0 matchedPath = lib/cli/registry.js matchedIdentity = npm:bWFuZHJlbA:2.43.0 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 14 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

lib/cli/registry.jsView on unpkg

lib/cli/update.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = mandrel@2.43.0 matchedPath = lib/cli/update.js matchedIdentity = npm:bWFuZHJlbA:2.43.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

lib/cli/update.jsView on unpkg