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mandrel@2.74.0: AI-agent control-surface risk | LPM Firewall

registry / mandrel / 2.74.0

mandrel@2.74.0

Claude Code-first opinionated workflow framework: instructions, skills, rules, and SDLC workflows that govern AI coding assistants.

AI Security Review

scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. Installation automatically replaces and prunes the consumer’s broad .agents control directory. The operation has no consent prompt or ownership check for existing files.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm installation with lifecycle scripts enabled in a consumer project.

Impact

Existing agent instructions, skills, rules, and workflows can be overwritten or removed, changing subsequent agent behavior.

Mechanism

The postinstall hook invokes sync using INIT_CWD; sync recursively copies package files into .agents and deletes unmatched existing files outside its exclusions.

Policy narrative

The npm postinstall hook runs automatically for dependency installations and directs sync to the consumer project. Sync copies the package’s agent instructions and other payload files into the shared .agents directory, overwriting matching files and deleting unmatched files without establishing package ownership. Limited local-file exclusions do not protect the remaining broad agent control surface. The interactive bootstrap prompt belongs to a separate explicit command and does not authorize these installation-time changes.

AI rationale

Inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface, including overwrite and deletion of existing consumer files. This meets the blocking policy independently of scanner labels or citation limits.

Evidence

package.jsonbin/postinstall.jslib/cli/sync.js.agents/instructions.md.agents/.agents/.mandrel-version

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/postinstall.js mandrel sync

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/postinstall.js mandrel sync

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

.agents/scripts/lib/qa/redact-evidence.jsView file

17patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 17

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

.agents/scripts/lib/qa/redact-evidence.jsView on unpkg · L17

bin/mandrel.jsView file

101function installedVersion() { L102: const req = createRequire(import.meta.url); L103: const manifest = req('../package.json');

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

bin/mandrel.jsView on unpkg · L101

bin/postinstall.jsView file

1Install-time AI-agent control hijack evidence: Install-time helper chain writes an AI-agent control surface: L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: // bin/postinstall.js — best-effort `.agents/` materializer on install. L3: ... L7: * doctor-detected "not materialized" state instead of failing the install. L8: * In the framework's own source checkout it no-ops, since `.agents/` there is L9: * the committed product and a sync would clobber it. ... L19: const HINT = L20: 'mandrel: could not materialize ./.agents/ during install — run `mandrel sync` to finish setup.\n'; L21: Referenced control path from bin/postinstall.js: L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: // bin/postinstall.js — best-effort `.agents/` materializer on install. L3: ... L7: * doctor-detected "not materialized" state instead of failing the ins

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

bin/postinstall.jsView on unpkg · L1

lib/cli/init.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

lib/cli/init.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

lib/cli/registry.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = mandrel@2.73.0 matchedPath = lib/cli/registry.js matchedIdentity = npm:bWFuZHJlbA:2.73.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

lib/cli/registry.jsView on unpkg

lib/cli/update.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = mandrel@2.73.0 matchedPath = lib/cli/update.js matchedIdentity = npm:bWFuZHJlbA:2.73.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

lib/cli/update.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

8 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 51-91json

51 "cyclomatic:update": "node .agents/scripts/check-cyclomatic.js --update",

52 "dead-exports:update": "node scripts/update-dead-exports-baseline.js && node scripts/update-dead-exports-baseline.js --production",

53 "check:knip-entries": "node scripts/check-knip-entries.js",

54 "validator:gen": "node scripts/check-generated-validator.js",

55 "validator:check": "node scripts/check-generated-validator.js --check",

56 "config:ceiling": "node scripts/check-agentrc-key-ceiling.js",

57 "check:comment-policy": "node scripts/check-comment-policy.js",

58 "check:schema-refs": "node scripts/check-schema-references.js",

59 "check:workflow-citations": "node scripts/check-workflow-citations.js",

60 "crap:check": "node .agents/scripts/check-baselines.js --gate crap",

61 "crap:update": "node .agents/scripts/update-crap-baseline.js",

62 "crap:reanchor": "node .agents/scripts/update-crap-baseline.js --full-scope",

63 "duplication:check": "node .agents/scripts/check-baselines.js --gate duplication",

64 "duplication:update": "node .agents/scripts/update-duplication-baseline.js",

65 "duplication:reanchor": "node .agents/scripts/update-duplication-baseline.js --full-scope",

66 "quality:preview": "node .agents/scripts/check-dead-exports.js && node .agents/scripts/quality-preview.js",

67 "quality:watch": "node .agents/scripts/quality-watch.js",

68 "sync:commands": "node bin/mandrel.js sync-commands",

69 "sync:agents": "node .agents/scripts/sync-claude-agents.js",

70 "prepare": "husky && npm run sync:commands && npm run sync:agents && npm run baselines:merge-driver",

71 "postinstall": "node bin/postinstall.js mandrel sync"

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L71

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L71

72 },

73 "repository": {

74 "type": "git",

75 "url": "git+https://github.com/dsj1984/mandrel.git"

76 },

77 "keywords": [

78 "claude-code",

79 "ai-agents",

80 "sdlc",

81 "workflow",

82 "orchestration",

83 "agentic"

84 ],

85 "author": "",

86 "license": "MIT",

87 "bin": {

88 "mandrel": "bin/mandrel.js"

89 },

90 "type": "module",

91 "bugs": {

.agents/scripts/lib/qa/redact-evidence.jsView file

Lines 1-37javascript

1/**

2 * redact-evidence.js — deterministic secrets/PII scrubber run before QA

3 * evidence is persisted or posted (security baseline § Data Leakage).

4 * Idempotent (placeholders match no rule) and pass-through for benign text.

5 */

6

7/**

8 * Per-rule placeholders, free of anything a pattern matches (`@`, `=`, long

9 * token or digit runs) so the pass is a fixed point.

10 *

11 *

bin/mandrel.jsView file

Lines 81-121javascript

81 ],

82 [

83 'explain',

84 {

85 description: 'print resolved config values and their sources',

86 knownFlags: new Set(['--json']),

87 },

88 ],

bin/postinstall.jsView file

Lines 1-21javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2// bin/postinstall.js — best-effort `.agents/` materializer on install.

3

4/**

5 * Runs `mandrel sync` on install. Best-effort by contract: always exits 0 so

6 * `--ignore-scripts`, sandboxed CI, or a copy error degrade to the

7 * doctor-detected "not materialized" state instead of failing the install.

8 * In the framework's own source checkout it no-ops, since `.agents/` there is

9 * the committed product and a sync would clobber it.

10 */

11

lib/cli/init.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

lib/cli/init.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

lib/cli/registry.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = mandrel@2.73.0 matchedPath = lib/cli/registry.js matchedIdentity = npm:bWFuZHJlbA:2.73.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

lib/cli/registry.jsView on unpkg

lib/cli/update.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = mandrel@2.73.0 matchedPath = lib/cli/update.js matchedIdentity = npm:bWFuZHJlbA:2.73.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

lib/cli/update.jsView on unpkg