registry / mano-coding / 0.1.36
mano-coding@0.1.36
Mano Coding CLI and toolchain
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe high-risk primitives are contained in an interactive CLI, not an npm lifecycle hook, and the inspected metadata response is parsed as JSON rather than executed. Static inspection found no concrete malicious behavior.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
A user runs the mano-coding command and explicitly selects a relevant CLI subcommand.
Impact
No unconsented install-time execution or data exfiltration was found.
Mechanism
User-invoked CLI validation, package management, and registry metadata lookup.
AI rationale
The high-risk primitives are contained in an interactive CLI, not an npm lifecycle hook, and the inspected metadata response is parsed as JSON rather than executed. Static inspection found no concrete malicious behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 92.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The bundle contains generated schema-validator code that uses Function.
- The CLI has a user-invoked self-upgrade command that can run a package-manager global install after its command action is selected.
Evidence against
- package.json declares no preinstall, install, postinstall, or prepare lifecycle hook.
- The published executable only imports the bundled CLI when the user runs its bin command.
- The metadata fetch is used to parse registry JSON; no remote response is passed to an execution sink.
- No credential harvesting, secret exfiltration, stealth persistence, or foreign AI-agent control-surface mutation was found.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
7 flaggeddist/bin.jsView file
49* Constructs the CommanderError class
L50: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit
L51: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error
...
L1159: var EventEmitter = __require("node:events").EventEmitter;
L1160: var childProcess = __require("node:child_process");
L1161: var path2 = __require("node:path");
...
L1209: this._outputConfiguration = {
L1210: writeOut: (str) => process4.stdout.write(str),
L1211: writeErr: (str) => process4.stderr.write(str),
...
L1248: * @returns {Command[]}
L1249: * @private
L1250: */
Critical
Remote Response Code Execution
Source passes code obtained from a remote response into a dynamic execution sink.
dist/bin.jsView on unpkg · L491159var EventEmitter = __require("node:events").EventEmitter;
L1160: var childProcess = __require("node:child_process");
L1161: var path2 = __require("node:path");
High
1999}
L2000: const execArgv = process4.execArgv ?? [];
L2001: if (execArgv.includes("-e") || execArgv.includes("--eval") || execArgv.includes("-p") || execArgv.includes("--print")) {
High
Findings
1 Critical5 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalRemote Response Code Executiondist/bin.js
HighChild Processdist/bin.js
HighShelldist/bin.js
HighEvaldist/bin.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/bin.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/bin.js
MediumDynamic Requirebin/mano-coding.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to mano-coding@0.1.36.
See all versions of mano-coding for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of mano-coding@0.1.36 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.