registry / mano-coding / 0.1.38
mano-coding@0.1.38
Mano Coding CLI and toolchain
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe high-risk evaluation signal is bundled schema-validator code generation, not remote-response execution. The package has no registry install lifecycle hook and inspection found no concrete malicious behavior.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
A user runs the mano-coding CLI.
Impact
The CLI may perform its documented package-management operations; no secret theft or remote code execution path was confirmed.
Mechanism
User-invoked CLI update and package-management features.
AI rationale
The high-risk evaluation signal is bundled schema-validator code generation, not remote-response execution. The package has no registry install lifecycle hook and inspection found no concrete malicious behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The CLI starts a background automatic-update worker after a user runs the command.
- The bundle uses Function for generated schema validation code.
- The manifest has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
Evidence against
- The Function call compiles locally generated validator code rather than a network response.
- Downloaded npm release data requires a declared integrity value before use.
- No credential harvesting, exfiltration, destructive behavior, or install-time execution was found.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
7 flaggeddist/bin.jsView file
49* Constructs the CommanderError class
L50: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit
L51: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error
...
L1159: var EventEmitter = __require("node:events").EventEmitter;
L1160: var childProcess = __require("node:child_process");
L1161: var path2 = __require("node:path");
...
L1209: this._outputConfiguration = {
L1210: writeOut: (str) => process4.stdout.write(str),
L1211: writeErr: (str) => process4.stderr.write(str),
...
L1248: * @returns {Command[]}
L1249: * @private
L1250: */
Critical
Remote Response Code Execution
Source passes code obtained from a remote response into a dynamic execution sink.
dist/bin.jsView on unpkg · L491159var EventEmitter = __require("node:events").EventEmitter;
L1160: var childProcess = __require("node:child_process");
L1161: var path2 = __require("node:path");
High
1999}
L2000: const execArgv = process4.execArgv ?? [];
L2001: if (execArgv.includes("-e") || execArgv.includes("--eval") || execArgv.includes("-p") || execArgv.includes("--print")) {
High
Findings
1 Critical5 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalRemote Response Code Executiondist/bin.js
HighChild Processdist/bin.js
HighShelldist/bin.js
HighEvaldist/bin.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/bin.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/bin.js
MediumDynamic Requirebin/mano-coding.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to mano-coding@0.1.38.
See all versions of mano-coding for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of mano-coding@0.1.38 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.