mano-coding@0.1.40
Mano Coding CLI and toolchain
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe default automatic global self-update and package-defined task execution warrant a warning. The inspected code does not establish malicious intent or an install-time attack chain.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
A user runs mano-coding, or invokes a command that applies resolved package tasks.
Impact
A registry-selected newer release can replace the global CLI; selected package tasks can modify their allowed project or template directories.
Mechanism
Default-on detached self-update and manifest-defined command execution.
AI rationale
The default automatic global self-update and package-defined task execution warrant a warning. The inspected code does not establish malicious intent or an install-time attack chain.
Evidence
dist/bin.js
Network endpoints1
registry.npmjs.org
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 84.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The CLI enables automatic updates by default.
- Every normal CLI invocation starts a detached update worker.
- The worker installs a newer mano-coding release globally after checking the registry.
- The package executes commands declared by resolved package tasks, although without a shell and with restricted working directories.
Evidence against
- package.json contains no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- The updater verifies that it is operating on a matching global mano-coding installation.
- No source path was found that harvests credentials or sends command output to an attacker-controlled endpoint.
- The dynamic Function finding is bundled AJV schema-validation code, not remote-response execution.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
7 flaggeddist/bin.jsView file
49* Constructs the CommanderError class
L50: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit
L51: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error
...
L1159: var EventEmitter = __require("node:events").EventEmitter;
L1160: var childProcess = __require("node:child_process");
L1161: var path2 = __require("node:path");
...
L1209: this._outputConfiguration = {
L1210: writeOut: (str) => process4.stdout.write(str),
L1211: writeErr: (str) => process4.stderr.write(str),
...
L1248: * @returns {Command[]}
L1249: * @private
L1250: */
Critical
Remote Response Code Execution
Source passes code obtained from a remote response into a dynamic execution sink.
dist/bin.jsView on unpkg · L491159var EventEmitter = __require("node:events").EventEmitter;
L1160: var childProcess = __require("node:child_process");
L1161: var path2 = __require("node:path");
High
1999}
L2000: const execArgv = process4.execArgv ?? [];
L2001: if (execArgv.includes("-e") || execArgv.includes("--eval") || execArgv.includes("-p") || execArgv.includes("--print")) {
High
14105sourceCode = this.opts.code.process(sourceCode, sch);
L14106: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode);
L14107: const validate = makeValidate(this, this.scope.get());
High
23625defaultGitExecutor = {
L23626: async exec(args, cwd) {
L23627: const { stdout, stderr: stderr2 } = await execFileAsync("git", args, {
...
L23630: env: {
L23631: ...process.env,
L23632: GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT: "0"
...
L23639: defaultManifestFetcher = {
L23640: async fetch({ url, ref, subdirectory, offline, cacheRoot, packageId }) {
L23641: if (offline) {
High
Same File Env Network Execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
dist/bin.jsView on unpkg · L2362549* Constructs the CommanderError class
L50: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit
L51: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error
...
L1159: var EventEmitter = __require("node:events").EventEmitter;
L1160: var childProcess = __require("node:child_process");
L1161: var path2 = __require("node:path");
...
L1209: this._outputConfiguration = {
L1210: writeOut: (str) => process4.stdout.write(str),
L1211: writeErr: (str) => process4.stderr.write(str),
...
L1248: * @returns {Command[]}
L1249: * @private
L1250: */
High
Command Output Exfiltration
Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.
dist/bin.jsView on unpkg · L49bin/mano-coding.jsView file
6if (existsSync(fileURLToPath(bundledBin))) {
L7: await import(bundledBin.href);
L8: } else {
Medium
Dynamic Require
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
bin/mano-coding.jsView on unpkg · L6Findings
1 Critical5 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalRemote Response Code Executiondist/bin.js
HighChild Processdist/bin.js
HighShelldist/bin.js
HighEvaldist/bin.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/bin.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/bin.js
MediumDynamic Requirebin/mano-coding.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to mano-coding@0.1.40.
See all versions of mano-coding for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of mano-coding@0.1.40 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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