md-redline@0.9.0
Inline review comments for markdown specs. Built-in MCP server hands feedback directly to your AI agent.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is not malicious under the install-control-surface policy because configuration mutation is explicitly user-invoked and there is no registry-install lifecycle hook. The embedded agent-control instructions and user-scope MCP registration warrant a warning.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The explicit mcp install command adds an md-redline server entry to Claude Desktop configuration.
- The MCP payload instructs an AI agent not to report to the user and to keep calling the package tool until it returns done.
- The server checks npm for updates and stores update state in its preferences.
- The manifest has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook; prepublishOnly only builds for publishing.
- Claude configuration changes require the explicit mdr mcp install command.
- Observed service calls are localhost APIs plus the npm registry update check; no credential collection or secret exfiltration was found.
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
bin/cli.jsView on unpkg · L36Source contains bidi control or invisible Unicode characters associated with Trojan Source attacks.
dist/assets/chunk-K5T4RW27-C38NE-jm.jsView on unpkg · L76Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to md-redline@0.9.0.
See all versions of md-redline for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of md-redline@0.9.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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