registry / AI-agent control-surface risk / mega-code-dev / 0.5.1

mega-code-dev@0.5.1

Mega Code CLI - corporate SSO login for Claude Code (dev environment)

AI Security Review

scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The postinstall hook makes an unconsented change to a user-level AI-agent extension surface by installing plugins automatically. This supports blocking publication as an AI-agent control-surface hijack, without establishing secret theft or arbitrary code execution by this package.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Installing the npm package when Claude Code is installed and the plugin opt-out is unset.

Impact

Plugins are added to the user's Claude Code environment and may affect later agent sessions.

Mechanism

The hook adds plugin marketplaces and installs mega-sdd and superpowers through the Claude CLI with user scope.

Policy narrative

During npm installation, the package can add marketplaces and install plugins into the user's Claude Code environment. The only plugin guard is an environment opt-out; installation otherwise proceeds automatically when the Claude CLI is available. The separately flagged settings helper is used by login and the explicit install command.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/postinstall.mjsdist/bin/bf.js

Network endpoints1

github.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI identified this as a dangerous AI-agent capability at 98.0% confidence with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for policy risk

package.json runs scripts/postinstall.mjs during npm installation.
The postinstall hook proceeds when Claude Code is present unless MEGA_CODE_SKIP_PLUGINS is set.
The hook adds plugin marketplaces and installs plugins with user scope.
The hook automatically installs mega-sdd and superpowers.
The separately flagged CLI helper targets Claude Code settings and is called by login and the explicit install command.

Evidence against

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings

Manifest

NoLicense

scanned 2 file(s), 645 KB of source, external domains: 10.190.7.99, 10.202.171.20, github.com, mega-code.bankmegadev.local

Source & flagged code

9 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 1-25json

2 "name": "mega-code-dev",

3 "version": "0.5.1",

4 "description": "Mega Code CLI - corporate SSO login for Claude Code (dev environment)",

5 "license": "UNLICENSED",

6 "type": "module",

7 "bin": {

8 "mega-code-dev": "dist/bin/bf.js"

9 },

10 "files": [

11 "dist",

12 "scripts"

13 ],

14 "scripts": {

15 "build": "node -e \"fs.rmSync('dist',{recursive:true,force:true})\" && tsc -p tsconfig.json",

16 "prepublishOnly": "npm run build",

17 "postinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.mjs",

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L17

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L17

18 "dev": "tsx src/bin/bf.ts",

19 "test": "vitest run"

20 },

21 "engines": {

22 "node": ">=20"

23 }

24}

dist/bin/bf.jsView file

14(Did you mean one of ${n.join(", ")}?)`:n.length===1?` L15: (Did you mean ${n[0]}?)`:""}An.suggestSimilar=Ba});var Ln=y(Ft=>{var Sa=se("node:events").EventEmitter,yt=se("node:child_process"),ye=se("node:path"),_0=se("node:fs"),I=se("node:pr... L16: - specify the name in Command constructor or using .name()`);return t=t||{},t.isDefault&&(this._defaultCommandName=e._name),(t.noHelp||t.hidden)&&(e._hidden=!0),this._registerComma...

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/bin/bf.jsView on unpkg · L14

38\v\f\r\x1B !"#\xA5%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\\]^_\`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}\u203E\x7F\uFFFD\uFFFD\uFFFD\uFFFD\uFFFD\uFFFD\uFFFD\u... L39: \v\f\r\x1B !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\xA5]^_\`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}\u203E\x7F\uFFFD\uFFFD\uFFFD\uFFFD\uFFFD\uFFFD\uFFFD\uF... L40: `).flatMap(t=>(0,_i.default)(t,e,{trim:!1,hard:!0}).split(` ... L50: at ${R}`)}let[L,F]=typeof v=="string"?[v]:v;c.render(L,F),Te.run()}catch(v){d(v)}}),Object.assign(l.then(v=>(Te.clearAll(),v),v=>{throw Te.clearAll(),v}).finally(()=>{o.forEach(v=>... L51: `).trimEnd()}${Ye}`});var Ls=re(Ki(),1),fn=re(Ts(),1);import{spawn as hx,spawnSync as px}from"child_process";import{readFileSync as Dx,unlinkSync as mx,writeFi

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/bin/bf.jsView on unpkg · L38

38\v\f\r\x1B !"#\xA5%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\\]^_\`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}\u203E\x7F\uFFFD\uFFFD\uFFFD\uFFFD\uFFFD\uFFFD\uFFFD\u... L39: \v\f\r\x1B !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\xA5]^_\`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}\u203E\x7F\uFFFD\uFFFD\uFFFD\uFFFD\uFFFD\uFFFD\uFFFD\uF... L40: `).flatMap(t=>(0,_i.default)(t,e,{trim:!1,hard:!0}).split(` ... L43: `)),x=o.reduce((D,g)=>D+g.length,0),u=D=>o[D]??[],c=mo({active:e,renderedItems:o,pageSize:n,loop:i}),l=u(e).slice(0,n),f=c+l.length<=n?c:n-l.length,d=Array.from({length:n});d.splic... L44: `)}var Ii=re(Bi(),1);import*as Ti from"node:readline";import{AsyncResource as Eo}from"node:async_hooks";var $e=[];$e.push("SIGHUP","SIGINT","SIGTERM");process.

scripts/postinstall.mjsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = mega-code-dev@0.5.0 matchedPath = scripts/postinstall.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:bWVnYS1jb2RlLWRldg:0.5.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/postinstall.mjsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 73c81fcc65798f56 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = mega-code-dev@0.5.0 matchedPath = scripts/postinstall.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:bWVnYS1jb2RlLWRldg:0.5.0 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 2 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

scripts/postinstall.mjsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

9 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

dist/bin/bf.jsView file

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

Findings

9 High4 Medium6 Low

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighChild Processdist/bin/bf.js

HighShell

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/bin/bf.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/bin/bf.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/bin/bf.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similarityscripts/postinstall.mjs

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/bin/bf.js

HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signaturescripts/postinstall.mjs

MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to mega-code-dev@0.5.1.

See all versions of mega-code-dev for other recorded verdicts.

Avoid installing mega-code-dev@0.5.1. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-20 04:10:53.848Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Related packages

Other AI-agent control-surface risk packages

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code

Related packages

Other AI-agent control-surface risk packages