memgineering@0.23.0

One memory for the AI you connect. Recall, remember, and revise a brain your agents share — stored in your own folder.

AI Security Review

scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The package contains a concrete install-time prompt-injection chain into persistent AI-agent configuration, but the hook itself only prints and no secret exfiltration or self-dependent lifecycle chain was verified. This warrants a warning rather than a block under the install-control-surface policy.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

Global npm installation in an environment where an AI agent consumes lifecycle output.

Impact

An agent may open a browser and later install persistent guidance or hooks into its configured agent homes without the package manager obtaining user consent.

Mechanism

Install-hook prompt injection leading to remote-controlled agent setup.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/postinstall.mjsdist/index.js~/.claude/CLAUDE.md~/.claude/skills~/.claude/settings.json~/.codex/AGENTS.md~/.codex/skills~/.codex/hooks.json

Network endpoints2

api.memgineering.commemgineering.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Unknown with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The install hook addresses an AI agent directly and instructs it to run setup immediately rather than stop for the user.
The prompted setup opens a browser and, after a remote session completes, can write guides, skills, and hooks into detected AI-agent homes.
This is an install-time social-engineering path toward persistent agent control-surface changes.

Evidence against

The postinstall script itself only prints when globally installed; it does not directly modify files or send data.
No self-dependency, obfuscated payload, or environment-secret harvesting was found.
The default API host is package-aligned, and credentials are stored locally after its device-login flow.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 17-57json

17 "memgineering": "bin/memgineering.js"

18 },

19 "main": "./dist/index.js",

20 "files": [

21 "bin",

22 "dist",

23 "assets",

24 "scripts",

25 "README.md",

26 "CHANGELOG.md",

27 "NOTICE"

28 ],

29 "scripts": {

30 "dev": "tsx src/index.ts",

31 "build": "tsup && rm -rf assets && mkdir -p assets && node scripts/copy-skills.mjs",

32 "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",

33 "pretest": "pnpm build",

34 "test": "vitest run",

35 "test:unit": "vitest run",

36 "prepublishOnly": "pnpm build",

37 "postinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.mjs"

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L37

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L37

38 },

39 "dependencies": {

40 "@iarna/toml": "^2.2.5",

41 "commander": "^12.1.0",

42 "kleur": "^4.1.5",

43 "prompts": "^2.4.2",

44 "semver": "^7.8.4",

45 "string-width": "^7.2.0",

46 "yaml": "^2.9.0",

47 "zod": "^3.23.8"

48 },

49 "devDependencies": {

50 "@kordis/api-client": "workspace:*",

51 "@kordis/config": "workspace:*",

52 "@kordis/contracts": "workspace:*",

53 "@kordis/harness-schema": "workspace:*",

54 "@kordis/memory-engine": "workspace:*",

55 "@kordis/storage-adapter": "workspace:*",

56 "@kordis/translators": "workspace:*",

57 "@types/node": "^22.9.0",

dist/index.jsView file

15function brandHome() { L16: return process.env[BRAND.homeEnvVar] ?? join(homedir(), BRAND.homeDirName); L17: } ... L121: function isInteractive() { L122: return Boolean(process.stdout.isTTY) && !jsonMode; L123: } L124: function printHuman(text) { L125: if (!jsonMode) process.stdout.write(text + "\n"); L126: } ... L137: for (let i = 0; i < input.length; i++) { L138: const code = input.charCodeAt(i); L139: if (code === 27 && input[i + 1] === "]" || code === 157) {

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L15

15Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js L15: function brandHome() { L16: return process.env[BRAND.homeEnvVar] ?? join(homedir(), BRAND.homeDirName); L17: } ... L121: function isInteractive() { L122: return Boolean(process.stdout.isTTY) && !jsonMode; L123: } L124: function printHuman(text) { L125: if (!jsonMode) process.stdout.write(text + "\n"); L126: } ... L137: for (let i = 0; i < input.length; i++) { L138: const code = input.charCodeAt(i); L139: if (code === 27 && input[i + 1] === "]" || code === 157) {

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L15

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/index.js: * it writes into somebody else's `~/.claude` and `~/.codex`. Conflating them import { mkdir, readFile, rename, rm, writeFile } from "fs/promises"; await writeFile(tmp, body, { encoding: "utf8", mode: 384 }); import { mkdir as mkdir3, readFile as readFile3, unlink, writeFile as writeFile2 } from "fs/promises"; await writeFile2(credentialsPath(), JSON.stringify(credentials, null, 2) + "\n", { import { mkdir as mkdir4, readFile as readFile4, unlink as unlink2, writeFile as writeFile3 } from "fs/promises"; await writeFile3(pendingLoginPath(), JSON.stringify(pending, null, 2) + "\n", { const base = args.baseUrl ?? apiUrl();

Source & flagged code

6 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

dist/index.jsView file

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Findings

2 Critical3 High4 Medium5 Low

CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js

HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/index.js

MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to memgineering@0.23.0.

See all versions of memgineering for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of memgineering@0.23.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-09 08:53:18.824Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code