memgineering@0.26.0

One memory for the AI you connect. Recall, remember, and revise a brain your agents share — stored in your own folder.

AI Security Review

scanned 13d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Source inspection found that installation only prints global setup guidance and does not perform agent setup. The agent configuration path is separate from installation, and the inspected telemetry path is opt-in and sends error details rather than credentials.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Installation runs the postinstall hook; agent configuration setup requires a separate CLI command.

Impact

The inspected source does not establish unconsented agent configuration changes or credential exfiltration.

Mechanism

The install hook prints guidance for global installs. The CLI setup path handles agent configuration, while error telemetry requires its saved setting to be on.

AI rationale

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

The manifest runs scripts/postinstall.mjs after installation.
The postinstall script prints setup guidance only for global installs; setup is a separate command.
The required Claude guidance location describes generated agent instructions, not executable code.
Setup obtains its configuration through the CLI action, and an interactive run asks how to proceed.
Error telemetry is gated on the saved errorTelemetry setting being on.
Registry client construction uses the configured registry API URL or the Kordis default.

Evidence against

The inspected install hook does not itself run agent setup or write agent configuration.
The inspected telemetry payload contains error and runtime details, not credentials.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Manifest

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 17-57json

17 "memgineering": "bin/memgineering.js"

18 },

19 "main": "./dist/index.js",

20 "files": [

21 "bin",

22 "dist",

23 "assets",

24 "scripts",

25 "README.md",

26 "CHANGELOG.md",

27 "NOTICE"

28 ],

29 "scripts": {

30 "dev": "tsx src/index.ts",

31 "build": "tsup && rm -rf assets && mkdir -p assets && node scripts/copy-skills.mjs",

32 "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",

33 "pretest": "pnpm build",

34 "test": "vitest run",

35 "test:unit": "vitest run",

36 "prepublishOnly": "pnpm build",

37 "postinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.mjs"

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L37

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L37

38 },

39 "dependencies": {

40 "@iarna/toml": "^2.2.5",

41 "commander": "^12.1.0",

42 "kleur": "^4.1.5",

43 "prompts": "^2.4.2",

44 "semver": "^7.8.4",

45 "string-width": "^7.2.0",

46 "yaml": "^2.9.0",

47 "zod": "^3.23.8"

48 },

49 "devDependencies": {

50 "@kordis/api-client": "workspace:*",

51 "@kordis/config": "workspace:*",

52 "@kordis/contracts": "workspace:*",

53 "@kordis/harness-schema": "workspace:*",

54 "@kordis/memory-engine": "workspace:*",

55 "@kordis/storage-adapter": "workspace:*",

56 "@kordis/translators": "workspace:*",

57 "@types/node": "^22.9.0",

dist/index.jsView file

15function brandHome() { L16: return process.env[BRAND.homeEnvVar] ?? join(homedir(), BRAND.homeDirName); L17: } ... L121: function isInteractive() { L122: return Boolean(process.stdout.isTTY) && !jsonMode; L123: } L124: function printHuman(text) { L125: if (!jsonMode) process.stdout.write(text + "\n"); L126: } ... L137: for (let i = 0; i < input.length; i++) { L138: const code = input.charCodeAt(i); L139: if (code === 27 && input[i + 1] === "]" || code === 157) {

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L15

15Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js L15: function brandHome() { L16: return process.env[BRAND.homeEnvVar] ?? join(homedir(), BRAND.homeDirName); L17: } ... L121: function isInteractive() { L122: return Boolean(process.stdout.isTTY) && !jsonMode; L123: } L124: function printHuman(text) { L125: if (!jsonMode) process.stdout.write(text + "\n"); L126: } ... L137: for (let i = 0; i < input.length; i++) { L138: const code = input.charCodeAt(i); L139: if (code === 27 && input[i + 1] === "]" || code === 157) {

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L15

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/index.js: * it writes into somebody else's `~/.claude` and `~/.codex`. Conflating them import { mkdir, readFile, rename, rm, writeFile } from "fs/promises"; await writeFile(tmp, body, { encoding: "utf8", mode: 384 }); import { mkdir as mkdir3, readFile as readFile3, unlink, writeFile as writeFile2 } from "fs/promises"; await writeFile2(credentialsPath(), JSON.stringify(credentials, null, 2) + "\n", { import { mkdir as mkdir4, readFile as readFile4, unlink as unlink2, writeFile as writeFile3 } from "fs/promises"; await writeFile3(pendingLoginPath(), JSON.stringify(pending, null, 2) + "\n", { const base2 = args.baseUrl ?? apiUrl();

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

dist/index.jsView file

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Findings

2 Critical4 High4 Medium5 Low

CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js

HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/index.js

MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

Low

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to memgineering@0.26.0.

See all versions of memgineering for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of memgineering@0.26.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-10 16:18:53.298Z (UTC).

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