modelence@0.23.1
The Node.js Framework for Real-Time MongoDB Apps
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aimodelence@0.23.1 is the published Modelence framework: no registry install hooks mutate the consumer, and network plus process use sit on explicit CLI commands and startApp talking to cloud.modelence.com. Scanner exfil labels are first-party setup, deploy, and opt-out app-start telemetry, including a same-vendor Claude plugin write only when setup finds no .claude/settings.json.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
No malicious trigger. Behavior runs when a user executes modelence CLI commands or calls startApp in their app.
Impact
No confirmed unauthorized secret theft, persistence, or install-time agent hijack.
Mechanism
First-party cloud CLI, deploy, and product telemetry
AI rationale
modelence@0.23.1 is the published Modelence framework: no registry install hooks mutate the consumer, and network plus process use sit on explicit CLI commands and startApp talking to cloud.modelence.com. Scanner exfil labels are first-party setup, deploy, and opt-out app-start telemetry, including a same-vendor Claude plugin write only when setup finds no .claude/settings.json.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- startApp posts project name, package version, hostname, and environment id to cloud.modelence.com unless MODELENCE_TRACKING_ENABLED is false.
- The modelence CLI talks to cloud.modelence.com for browser login, setup, bundle upload, and deploy.
- modelence setup may create .claude/settings.json that enables the first-party Modelence Claude Code plugin when that file is missing.
- The CLI uses execSync for a user post-build command and to launch tsx or node.
- The prepare script sets git core.hooksPath to .husky two directories up.
Evidence against
- No preinstall, install, or postinstall hooks; prepare is monorepo husky config and prepublishOnly only builds.
- Hosts are first-party Modelence Cloud, docs, GitHub, Google OAuth, and a public disposable-email list.
- CLI network, env writes, and Claude settings happen only when the user runs modelence commands.
- Tracking is product telemetry of app identity, not env or secret scraping, and startApp is the trigger rather than install or import.
- The Claude plugin is the same-vendor github.com/modelence/modelence marketplace and is created only if .claude/settings.json does not already exist.
Source & flagged code
9 flaggeddist/bin/modelence.jsView file
1Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination.
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: import {Command}from'commander';import {readFileSync,promises,createWriteStream}from'fs';import {fileURLToPath}from'url';import O,{join,dirname}from'path';import {parse}from'dotenv...
L3: `);}var $=".claude",w=join($,"settings.json"),D="modelence@modelence",I={modelence:{source:{source:"github",repo:"modelence/modelence"}}};async function ne(){let e=join(process.cwd...
L4: `),console.log(`Enabled the Modelence Claude Code plugin in ${w}`);}catch(o){console.warn(`Failed to create ${w}:`,o);}return}try{let n=JSON.parse(t)?.enabledPlugins?.[D];n!==!0&&c...
L5: `);if(await promises.writeFile(t,i.trim()+`
...
L8: `),console.log(" npm install (if you haven't already)"),console.log(` npm
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/bin/modelence.jsView on unpkg · L1•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = modelence@0.25.1
matchedIdentity = npm:bW9kZWxlbmNl:0.25.1
similarity = 0.625
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
Critical
Previous Version Dangerous Delta
This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
dist/bin/modelence.jsView on unpkgFindings
2 Critical6 High4 Medium6 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/bin/modelence.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/bin/modelence.js
HighChild Processdist/bin/modelence.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/bin/modelence.js
HighHost Fingerprint Exfiltrationdist/chunk-LCXJNLNK.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/bin/modelence.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/chunk-LCXJNLNK.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/bin/modelence.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/bin/modelence.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to modelence@0.23.1.
See all versions of modelence for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of modelence@0.23.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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