monogrok@1.0.34

Package advertises itself as a bulk-mailing / mail-server abuse toolkit (homepage mntmc.rip) and ships modules for bulk mail delivery (func/snd/mlr/*), SMTP credential brute/scan against third-party providers including AWS SES (func/smx/* — aws.js, awssho.js, awsxt.js, crdv.js, passgo.js, vaws.js), Shodan enumeration (func/sho/*), IMAP/POP3/EWS/M365 mailbox access (func/box/imap.js, pop3.js, ewsv.js, msap.js), Chrome cookie handling (func/box/chrm.js, ckie.js, ckpr.js), redirector chains (func/rdt/*), IP/proxy rotation (func/ipr/*), and email extractors. The entire code tree (396 files) is protected with javascript-obfuscator (string-array + RC4-style decoder + self-defending wrapper); devDependencies declare javascript-obfuscator and caxa (single-binary packager). The package's `main` (oibWljdTg.js) wires an integrity/tamper subsystem at load time that, on integrity failure, POSTs hostname, os.userInfo().username, cwd, pid, timestamp, and a Bearer token read from ~/.monotomic.token to https://api.mntmc.rip/ibW9B3RlbmF/token/security/tamper. Installer-side impact under this engine's threat model is limited: the offensive functionality targets third-party mail servers and credential owners, not the installer (the installer is the operator who chose to run this tooling); the load-time POST carries only limited host identifiers plus a token that the package itself provisioned in the installer's home directory, so it is closer to license/anti-tamper phone-home than to credential-harvest exfiltration. There is no traced read of ~/.aws/, ~/.ssh/, ~/.npmrc, browser secret stores, or environment credential scraping in this package's own load path. Routing to human review because (a) the package is commercial abuse-tooling sold through an external portal, which many downstream distribution channels will want to advisory on regardless of installer-side attack shape, and (b) the combination of full-tree obfuscation + author-endpoint load-time beacon + offensive purpose is a composite risk that a human should adjudicate for publication policy. ## Source: ghsa-malware (d5c1f66e8c5e2e97b3fc1b3d8819b405e9187fc5fdd2cedc0882e018e2da56bd) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.