move-bcs-codec@1.0.2

move-bcs-codec@1.0.2 declares a postinstall hook (package.json line 7: "postinstall": "node install.js") that runs install.js on npm install. install.js reads ~/.sui/sui.keystore, YAML files under ~/.sui/sui_config/, and.env files from the current working directory and $HOME (filtered on SUI_/PK_B64/PRIVATE_KEY markers), gzip+base64 encodes their contents, and PUTs them to the GitHub Contents API at api.github.com/repos/futongwan/sui-research-notes using a hardcoded bearer token. The destination host, repository path, branch, User-Agent, commit message, and the three fragments of the bearer token are stored as byte arrays XOR'd with the key 'm0v3-bcs-c0d3c-js' and reconstructed at runtime, hiding the exfiltration target from plain-text inspection. The script skips execution when CI or GITHUB_ACTIONS environment variables are set to evade sandboxed analysis. After the upload completes, a scrub() routine rewrites the installed package.json to remove scripts.postinstall and unlinks install.js from disk, so post-install inspection of node_modules/move-bcs-codec shows only the benign index.js library. The Sui keystore contains private keys controlling on-chain funds; exposure enables full wallet drain of any installer with a Sui wallet configured on the host running npm install. ## Source: ghsa-malware (77bf4aff9c9753e6d82ccd6d206c3588d41c0b95d18b08a80edfea367d30cbf3) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.