---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/mutex-forge/v/2.0.0"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/mutex-forge/v/2.0.0.md"
package: "mutex-forge"
report_status: "published"
title: "mutex-forge@2.0.0 npm security report"
verdict: "malicious"
version: "2.0.0"
---

# mutex-forge@2.0.0 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Blocked & quarantined** — Quarantined by product-default policy — this version is not allowed through the firewall.

- **Verdict:** Malicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Block
- **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Malware
- **Selected version:** 2.0.0
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** OSV Malicious Advisory (OpenSSF/OSV)

OpenSSF/OSV advisory MAL-2026-13955 confirms this npm version as malicious. The package presents itself as a mutex/semaphore library but contains a hidden second-stage loader in lib/Mutex.js. When runExclusive is invoked with a callback carrying meta.jobId === 'cross-chain-transfer', it detach-spawns Node on the sibling obfuscated file lib/withLoad.min.js...

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** external-osv-malicious-v1
- **Verdict:** Malicious
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Started:** 2026-08-14T15:05:06.912Z
- **Finished:** 2026-08-14T15:05:06.912Z
- **Download time:** Not available
- **Static scan time:** Not available
- **AI review time:** Not available
- **Total time:** Not available

## Security analysis

No additional public attack-surface or AI-review details are available.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Osv Malicious Advisory
- **Category:** External Intel
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

The package presents itself as a mutex/semaphore library but contains a hidden second-stage loader in lib/Mutex.js. When runExclusive is invoked with a callback carrying meta.jobId === 'cross-chain-transfer', it detach-spawns Node on the sibling obfuscated file lib/withLoad.min.js. That stage collects host reconnaissance (platform, release, arch, hostname, cpus, memory, uptime) and posts it to a hardcoded Telegram bot (api.telegram.org, chat -1003952553968) and a hardcoded Slack channel (slack.com chat.postMessage, channel C0B8XPGCKQS) using base64-encoded xoxb and Telegram bot tokens shipped in the file. It then connects to Ethereum Sepolia via Alchemy (eth-sepolia.g.alchemy.com) and Infura (sepolia.infura.io), reads encrypted TData1/TData2/getChunk fields from contract 0xE390863Dac96a7118C71227C2b099B50cF602D31, AES-GCM decrypts the payload using an X25519-derived key, writes the reassembled bytes to disk, and spawns them with process.execPath detached. A third stage (lib/tryLoad.min.d.js) polls slack.com/api/conversations.history every 10s with a hardcoded xoxb bot token, filters messages from a specific attacker user\_id, AES-GCM/PBKDF2 decrypts and reassembles chunked JSON into ~/subwatcher, chmod 755s it, and spawns it with Node — a persistent remote-command channel. The loader then unlinks lib/withLoad.min.js, lib/withLoad.min.d.js, and lib/tryLoad.min.d.js, rewrites lib/Mutex.js to strip the malicious branch (lines 25..40), and optionally edits../LICENSE, erasing the trigger after the assessment launches. All network destinations, contract address, channel ids, and bot tokens are concealed behind obfuscator.io-style rotated string arrays and base64. Live third-party Slack (xoxb-11307403103236-..., xoxb-11301867762550-...) and Telegram (8961878831:AAG4WTbRUcbXI5UCaN4VXK8k57ghqqkg\_qI) bot tokens are embedded in the shipped payload.

\#\# Source: ghsa-malware (3de0a9fa65df037ea65a1ecebdf98528c3733f77e524b21f4c28358262f7cd12) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 0
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 0
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0

## Package metadata
- **Package:** mutex-forge
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 2.0.0
- **Version published:** 2026-08-11T10:01:13.041Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-08-13T15:48:14.170Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-08-14T15:05:06.912Z
- **Known versions:** 3
- **Latest version:** 2.0.2
- **Appeal under review:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/mutex-forge/v/2.0.0>)
- [OSV advisory](<https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13955>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/mutex-forge/v/2.0.1>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/mutex-forge/v/2.0.2>)
- [ADVISORY](<https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2gqm-6m3p-62g5>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/mutex-forge/v/2.0.0>)
