mw-communication-client@10.0.0
Benign security placeholder / dependency-confusion PoC, no functional code. See Moveworks bug bounty report.
AI Security Review
scanned 9d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe install hooks perform automatic disclosure of identifying installation data to a fixed external recipient without installer consent. This supports blocking as install-hook abuse.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The preinstall hook makes an HTTP GET to a fixed address, sending the user name, hostname, and working directory.
- The postinstall hook repeats that disclosure automatically during installation, with no consent check.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedInstall-time lifecycle script matches a deterministic static-gate block pattern.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script matches a deterministic static-gate block pattern.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to mw-communication-client@10.0.0.
See all versions of mw-communication-client for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing mw-communication-client@10.0.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Source advisory published: .
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