registry / my-auto-follow / 1.0.6

my-auto-follow@1.0.6

modded baileys

AI Security Review

scanned 17d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The normal socket construction contains an unconditional remote-controlled auto-follow action. No caller option or consent check limits the channels followed.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

A consumer creates the package's normal WhatsApp message socket and waits 120 seconds.

Impact

An operator can make a consumer's authenticated WhatsApp account follow arbitrary channels without the consumer's instruction.

Mechanism

The socket fetches a JSON list from raw.githubusercontent.com and sends a WhatsApp FOLLOW query for each supplied newsletter ID, eleven seconds apart.

Attack narrative

The exported socket factory reaches makeMessagesSocket, which unconditionally creates makeNewsletterSocket. That constructor schedules a fetch of a remotely controlled channel list, then uses the authenticated WhatsApp query mechanism to follow every listed channel. This creates a covert, remotely changeable account-action channel rather than a user-invoked newsletter feature.

AI rationale

The package performs an unconsented, remotely controlled account mutation through its normal runtime entrypoint. This is concrete malicious behavior and warrants blocking publication.

Evidence

lib/index.jslib/Socket/messages-send.jslib/Socket/newsletter.js

Network endpoints1

raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json

OSV advisory

npm/my-auto-follow is a Baileys WhatsApp Web API fork that embeds undisclosed, remote-controlled consentless newsletter auto-follow behavior. In lib/Socket/newsletter.js, after a session is established the code waits 120 seconds, fetches a JSON list of WhatsApp newsletter JIDs from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json (attacker-controlled; observed contents include newsletter JIDs), and silently issues newsletterWMexQuery(..., QueryIds.FOLLOW) for each entry with errors swallowed. There is no caller opt-in. Trigger is runtime (makeNewsletterSocket / normal socket path), not install: preinstall only checks Node >= 20. The package also depends on libsignal via the npm alias npm:@dreamguyxeon/libsignal-node@1.0.1 (separate malicious patcher reported alongside this entry). Related DGXeon campaign packages already in OSV include dgxeon-baileys (MAL-2026-2252) and baileys-dgxeon (MAL-2025-806). Tarball sha256 for 1.0.3: 1332d396a2251692c2654fca52620a433a880551500a567ade040e8f01440e68. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (983397af6686fd3a8ae5538fbc62139959592c3a7ac24c100055a57ed1fe8f05) my-auto-follow@1.0.6 is a Baileys WhatsApp library fork with two installer-affecting behaviors. First, package.json declares the dependency whatsapp-rust-bridge-baron as git+https://github.com/7ucg/whatsapp-rust-bridge.git with no commit SHA or tag pin; the tarball ships no bundled node_modules for it, so npm install resolves the git URL at install time and executes whatever code and lifecycle hooks the HEAD of that repository contains, entirely outside the installer's version pinning and integrity control. Second, makeNewsletterSocket in the package's default socket construction schedules a 120-second timer that fetches a channel-ID list from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json (an unpinned mutable branch on a personal GitHub account) and issues WhatsApp newsletter FOLLOW queries for each ID using the caller's authenticated WhatsApp session, inflating the author's channel subscribers using the installer's identity. This behavior is not disclosed in README, and the target list can be changed remotely at any time by whoever controls that repository.

my-auto-follow@1.0.6

AI Security Review

OSV advisory

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Source & flagged code