nebula-notebook@0.2.10
AI-native notebook computing environment — real Jupyter kernels, real filesystem, built to be driven by agents (Claude Code / Codex) via MCP
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner’s install/runtime findings map to documented notebook functionality and a repo-checkout-only postinstall hook. Direct inspection found no concrete malicious behavior or unconsented control-surface mutation.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json defines postinstall.
- scripts/postinstall.cjs can run npm install only in a repo checkout.
- postinstall exits when installed under node_modules, so published dependency installs do not mutate subpackages.
- CLI only launches the bundled local server with inherited arguments.
- Network use is a notify-only npm update check.
- No credential harvesting, external exfiltration, remote payload loading, or AI-agent config mutation found.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/assets/index-NfxQwPBq.jsView on unpkg · L791Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to nebula-notebook@0.2.10.
See all versions of nebula-notebook for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of nebula-notebook@0.2.10 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.