nebula-notebook@0.2.11
AI-native notebook computing environment — real Jupyter kernels, real filesystem, built to be driven by agents (Claude Code / Codex) via MCP
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe flagged lifecycle behavior is explicitly checkout-only and exits in node_modules. Source inspection supports a user-invoked notebook/terminal application, not malicious execution or exfiltration.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json defines postinstall, and scripts/postinstall.cjs invokes npm install in checkout subpackages.
- Runtime server intentionally exposes authenticated notebook, kernel, and PTY capabilities.
- scripts/postinstall.cjs exits before any install work when located under node_modules.
- bin/nebula-notebook.js only launches the packaged server with user-provided CLI arguments.
- Terminal and agent state writes are package-owned ~/.nebula files and occur only through the running authenticated service.
- node-server/dist/update-check.js only fetches the package's npm latest endpoint and never installs code.
- No credential harvesting, arbitrary remote payload download, obfuscated loader, or foreign AI-agent config mutation found.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/assets/index-NfxQwPBq.jsView on unpkg · L791Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to nebula-notebook@0.2.11.
See all versions of nebula-notebook for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of nebula-notebook@0.2.11 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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