nebula-notebook@0.2.17
AI-native notebook computing environment — real Jupyter kernels, real filesystem, built to be driven by agents (Claude Code / Codex) via MCP
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection contradicts the malicious lifecycle hint, but confirms a powerful AI-agent and shell-control surface. Warn for dangerous capability rather than block: no exfiltration, remote payload execution, or foreign agent-control mutation was found.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Runtime server exposes a PTY shell with inherited environment.
- Runtime persists Nebula-owned remote-agent settings under ~/.nebula.
- Agent diagnostics can invoke installed Claude/Codex CLIs on request.
- Server performs a daily version check against npm registry.
- postinstall exits when installed under node_modules, before package-manager commands.
- No lifecycle path writes Codex, Claude, Cursor, or other foreign agent configuration.
- Observed network endpoint is the package's own npm update check; no exfiltration endpoint found.
- CLI launcher only starts the bundled server and forwards user arguments.
Source & flagged code
9 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgA bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/assets/index-Cq1BG1_T.jsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to nebula-notebook@0.2.17.
See all versions of nebula-notebook for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of nebula-notebook@0.2.17 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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