nebula-notebook@0.2.32
AI-native notebook computing environment — real Jupyter kernels, real filesystem, built to be driven by agents (Claude Code / Codex) via MCP
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiStatic inspection found a registry postinstall guard, a user-invoked server launcher, and protected API routing. No concrete malicious behavior was identified.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest declares a postinstall handler.
- The postinstall handler exits when running from node_modules, so it does not run its checkout setup during registry installation.
- The command-line launcher starts the packaged server only when the user invokes the command.
- The server applies authentication middleware to protected API routes.
- The browser bundle contains a Jupyter widget CDN default, not a package-controlled collection endpoint.
- The server can invoke OpenSSL to create a local self-signed certificate during server startup.
- The browser bundle references the public jsDelivr CDN for widget assets.
Source & flagged code
9 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/assets/index-DbRuvtfE.jsView on unpkg · L816Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to nebula-notebook@0.2.32.
See all versions of nebula-notebook for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of nebula-notebook@0.2.32 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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