nebula-notebook@0.2.72
AI-native notebook computing environment — real Jupyter kernels, real filesystem, built to be driven by agents (Claude Code / Codex) via MCP
AI Security Review
scanned 24d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection shows the install-time nested installs are gated to repository checkouts and target only the package’s own subpackages. The flagged process and dynamic-code patterns support ordinary launcher, GPU inventory, and plural-form parsing behavior; no concrete attack was identified.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The postinstall hook calls the package script, which exits when installed under node_modules and otherwise installs only repository subpackages.
- The launcher starts the packaged server and forwards command-line arguments and the environment.
- The resource service runs GPU inventory commands through a timeout wrapper and parses their output.
- The frontend bundle’s dynamic function construction validates a plural-form expression before compiling it.
Source & flagged code
9 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/assets/index-pBlQK-xI.jsView on unpkg · L826Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to nebula-notebook@0.2.72.
See all versions of nebula-notebook for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of nebula-notebook@0.2.72 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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