negotium@0.21.1
Install the Negotium multi-agent runtime and CLI with one package
AI Security Review
scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inspected evidence does not support the scanner's malicious label: flagged agent locations show ordinary package runtime paths and session handling, and the install hook invokes package-owned installers. No concrete attack behavior was established.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs two package-owned binary installers at postinstall.
- The flagged auth-path helper locations resolve the Codex auth file from CODEX_HOME or the user's .codex directory.
- The Claude integration writes synthetic session rollouts under ~/.claude/projects.
- The hosted-agent code scopes CODEX_HOME for its child environment.
- The registry code copies a session rollout into a project-specific Claude directory only when the destination is absent.
- The flagged query and browser runtime files contain ordinary logger and browser-process imports; no attack behavior is established by these excerpts.
- The package has a postinstall hook, so its installer behavior merits review.
- The browser runtime imports child_process, but this excerpt does not show malicious execution.
Source & flagged code
9 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/hosted-agent.jsView on unpkg · L50Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to negotium@0.21.1.
See all versions of negotium for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of negotium@0.21.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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