negotium@0.22.1
Install the Negotium multi-agent runtime and CLI with one package
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found a postinstall limited to downloading two versioned project binaries with SHA-256 checks. The flagged agent and credential code supports package runtime operations, and the reviewed paths did not establish malicious behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs two named postinstall installers; each downloads a versioned binary from the project’s GitHub releases and checks its SHA-256 before installing it.
- Codex auth paths point to the configured CODEX_HOME auth file, while hosted-agent code can use a separate hosted CODEX_HOME.
- Claude session rollout creation follows a session fork and writes the resulting rollout into that project’s Claude sessions directory; Codex rollout writing is an exported runtime operation.
- Provider keys are read from the user vault and passed as API key overrides to the Maestro provider.
- The reviewed source supports ordinary package setup and runtime features; no concrete credential theft or unconsented agent-control attack was identified.
Source & flagged code
9 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/hosted-agent.jsView on unpkg · L50Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to negotium@0.22.1.
See all versions of negotium for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of negotium@0.22.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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