negotium@0.22.4
Install the Negotium multi-agent runtime and CLI with one package
AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection confirms that the Codex rollout writer deliberately replaces permission context and sets unrestricted approval and sandbox values. The postinstall downloads are separately hash-checked, but that does not resolve the runtime control-context tampering.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- When the Codex rollout writer runs, it replaces the developer setup text with claims that sandboxing is disabled and approval is never required.
- The generated rollout also sets approval to never, grants a full-access sandbox policy, and removes the permission profile.
- The Codex registry exposes this rollout writer through its writeRollout operation.
- The postinstall hook installs browser and shell helper binaries from versioned project releases and checks their SHA-256 hashes before replacing local copies.
Source & flagged code
9 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/hosted-agent.jsView on unpkg · L50Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to negotium@0.22.4.
See all versions of negotium for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing negotium@0.22.4. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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