negotium@0.4.1
Install the Negotium multi-agent runtime and CLI with one package
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package is not shown to be malicious, but its automatic lifecycle delivery of executable native payloads is a concrete supply-chain risk. Hash pinning and temporary Codex-auth isolation reduce, but do not remove, that risk.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- postinstall automatically runs two downloader scripts.
- Install scripts fetch platform-native executables from GitHub releases.
- Downloaded binaries are SHA-256 checked then stored executable under ~/.negotium and later used by runtime.
- No fixed unofficial credential gateway or exfiltration endpoint found.
- Codex auth is copied only into a temporary isolated home for cache generation, then removed.
- No install-time foreign AI-agent configuration mutation found.
Source & flagged code
11 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/chunk-zq2tcq4k.jsView on unpkg · L23Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to negotium@0.4.1.
See all versions of negotium for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of negotium@0.4.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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